

Self Aware Events : *Finding* and *Losing Oneself*

A Cognitive Linguistic Analysis

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ABSTRACT

The following research presents a Cognitive Linguistic analysis of the construal and predication of Self-Awareness by way of the English reflexive construction employing two predicates ; *find / lose oneself* (hereafter *SA event*). The first analysis is from Cognitive Grammar (CG). CG-inspired schematics allow construal components of SA events to be depicted economically. The second analysis, from Conceptual Metaphor theory, concludes with a 5-step logic that accurately explains how Self-Awareness comes to have the metaphorical meaning it does. The third analysis discusses the relationships between metaphor and metonymy. Within this discussion, SA events are found to be cases of both *metonymy within metaphor* as well as *target-in-source* construal, in that the reflexive pronoun displays a metonymic relationship (specifically a WHOLE FOR PART) to the specific mental function of Self-Awareness. SA event predications as a whole, on the other hand, are expressed metaphorically by way of the cross-domain mapping of conceptual entailments of the verbs *find* and *lose*, and construe the conceptual metaphors [FINDING ONESELF IS AWARENESS OF SELF] and [LOSING ONESELF IS LOSS OF AWARENESS OF SELF].

Various individual components of SA events have been categorized in the literature in different ways, but analysis of *SA events* as whole, independent phenomena that motivate metaphorical construal is lacking. This discussion provides corpus data as well as theoretical arguments that support the delineation and categorization of the mental state of Self-Awareness as an independent conception that motivates the metaphorical construal of *find* and *lose* when occurring within the reflexive construction.

1. Introduction

The following research presents a Cognitive Linguistic analysis of the construal and predication of Self-Awareness by way of the English reflexive construction employing two specific predicates ; *find / lose oneself* (hereafter *SA event*). The first analysis is from a Cognitive Grammar perspective (Ronald W Langacker, 1987, 1999 ; R.W. Langacker, 2006), the second is from Conceptual Metaphor theory (A. Lakoff & Becker, 1992 ; G. Lakoff, 1990b, 1993, 1996 ; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 2008), and the third discusses the relationship between metaphor and metonymy. Within this discussion, it will be seen that SA events are cases of both *metonymy within metaphor* (Goossens, 2002) as well as *target-in-source* (Ruiz

de Mendoza & Díez, 2002) construal, in that the reflexive pronoun displays a metonymic relationship (specifically a WHOLE FOR PART) to the specific mental function of Self-Awareness. SA event predications as a whole, on the other hand, are expressed metaphorically by way of the cross-domain mapping of conceptual entailments of the verbs *find* and *lose*, and construe the conceptual metaphors [FINDING ONESELF IS AWARENESS OF SELF] and [LOSING ONESELF IS LOSS OF AWARENESS OF SELF]¹, as in the following :

1. ...*Pelorate found himself* looking down on white swirls with an occasional glimpse of pale blue or rusty brown... (Asimov, 2012, p. 68)
2. *She lost herself* in the delicious daydream of being part of that group...
(COCA : 1997.FIC.Bk.AfterNight)

These types of expressions have been categorized in the literature in different ways, but discussion of the *Self-Awareness* as an independent phenomenon that motivates the construals is lacking. This discussion provides corpus examples to support² theoretical arguments that reinforces the need to delineate and categorize the mental state of Self-Awareness as an independent concept that is able to motivate the metaphorical construal of *find* and *lose* when occurring within the reflexive construction.

1.1. *Self-Awareness* defined

For the purpose of this linguistically oriented discussion, I will define *Self-Awareness* in the following way :

Self-Awareness is the cognitive function of conscious meta-perceptual awareness ; in other words, the mental state of conscious awareness of one's physical, emotional and mental *reaction(s)* to interior and/or exterior perceptions.

It is critical here to distinguish between *Self-Awareness* and *perception*, although in folk³ use these may have a similar meaning. *Perception*, as it is used here, involves the direct, involuntary reactions to stimuli in/on the body and/or mind, i.e. the physical and/or emotional stimuli from an injury, or the physical/emotional feeling(s) brought about by the tender words from a loved one, etc. *Perceptions* therefore, are basic, neurological reactions to mental/environmental stimuli. Self-Awareness, on the other hand, is the *Awareness of these perceptions*. It may be thought of as a type of *meta-perception*, i.e. the mind is aware of its own reactions to some physical or mental stimuli. This can be seen as occurring in three steps : 1) a stimulus is present (e.g., thorn prick on finger) 2) the mind perceives the stimulus (e.g., involuntarily

¹ This discussion will follow the conventional cognitive semantic typography as conveyed by Feyaerts (Goossens, 2002, p. 361). Small capitals (TREE) will be used for conceptual structures, italics (*tree*) for linguistic structures, and double quotes ("tree") will be used for semantic structures.

² The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) and the British National Corpus (BNC) were consulted in this research.

³ The use of the word *folk* here is not meant in a derogatory sense, but to mean the non-specialist use of a word or phrase within a given society.

pulls hand away) 3) an awareness of the perception of stimulus arises (e.g., thinking: “*That hurts, now my finger is throbbing.*”) This third step is the meaning of Self-Awareness used throughout this discussion.

2. Cognitive Grammar and SA

This section will begin with a review of the literal expression *The man found the cat* according to Cognitive Grammar (CG) (Ronald W Langacker, 2002, Chapter 6) and then propose an original analysis for *The man lost the cat* based on that model. Similarities and differences will be analyzed and discussed. Following this, a discussion of reflexive expressions in CG reveals that reflexive expressions are treated as special cases of Subjectification in which the viewpoint of the conceptualizer, most commonly implicit, is included in the predication. Revision of the reflexive model will be necessary to represent the verbs *find/lose* as they occur metaphorically, especially with regard to the reflexive ‘Subjective’ elements contained in the overall construal.

2.1. Cognitive Grammar and *find/lose*

How is it that CG accounts for expressions using *find* and *lose* as they occur in language use?⁴ Looking at (3), it can be seen that there are two nominals (‘things’, i.e., *man* and *cat*) and one verb (‘processual relation’, i.e., *find*)⁵.

3. *The man found the cat.*

According to CG, “The base of [FIND] includes a search process of indefinite duration. Only the final stages of that process are actually designated by the predicate and hence profiled...” (2002, p. 169). In other words, the process of [FIND] is continuous, but only the culmination of the process is given prominence because [FIND] only occurs at the end of some searching process. However, counter-examples in which *find* does not include a ‘search process’ can also be construed and acceptably predicated. For example, a ‘base’ concept of ‘search process’ is untenable in (4a, c) and (5a, c)⁶:

- 4a. (John lost his wallet last night. Jenny does not know John.)
Jenny found a wallet in the street.
- b. (John knows Jenny and asked her to search for his lost wallet.)
Jenny found the wallet in the street.
- c. *Jenny unintentionally/accidentally found a/the wallet.*

⁴ The original analysis in Langacker (2002) pertains to the Hopi language, but his methods and analysis supporting the theory are applicable to the proposal offered here.

⁵ ‘Thing’ and ‘Relation’ are CG specific terms. See Langacker (2002, Chapter 6) for precise definitions. (In this example, the definite article will not be analyzed for ease of explanation.)

⁶ In cases where minimal pairs are necessary to make a point, original examples are used.

5a. (Harry went to the garden, but surprisingly, his wife was there.)

Harry found his wife sitting in the garden.

b. (Harry was searching for his wife.)

Harry found his wife sitting in the garden.

c. *Harry unintentionally/accidentally found his wife in the garden.*

The ‘search’ conception involved for [FIND] may or may not be present. In (4a, 5a), The *wallet* and *wife* simply appeared as visual stimuli, at which point they were *found*. The lack of a ‘search’ component in (4a, 5a) can be further supported by (4c, 5c), where modifying *find* with an adverb incompatible with ‘search’ is unproblematic.

Langacker’s analysis is accurate in that only the ‘culminating event’ is profiled for [FIND] (for both ‘search’ and ‘non-search’ variations). For full predications in the CG framework, [FIND] interacts schematically with its *trajector* (*tr*) (main focus of construal) and *landmark* (*lm*) (secondary focus of construal). The composite scene is created out of the relationship between the more abstract schema levels to more concrete levels, as needed by the speaker and hearer to decode the intended message. Langacker (2002, p. 173, Figure 7) provides a schematic for *The man found the cat* in which the ‘search’ variant of [FIND] correlates with [CAT] and [MAN]. As proposed here, however, a new schematic for ‘non-search’ [FIND] is also necessary, provided in Figure 1. Only two sub-events are necessary for describing the (*tr*) and (*lm*) along the *processual timeline* (*t*). The first (left side of figure) where *the man* (*tr*) is not ‘aware’ of *the cat* (*lm*), i.e. THE MAN is ‘not searching’ for the CAT, and the second (right side of figure) where *the man* (*tr*) is ‘aware’ of the cat (*lm*), i.e. THE MAN ‘comes upon’ the CAT. The ellipse surrounding *the man-cat* now represents ‘Awareness’ (i.e., ‘non-search’ *Awareness of perception*). Therefore, with only slight adaptations to account for the ‘non-search alternation of [FIND],





Figure 1. *The man found the cat.* (based on Ronald W Langacker, 2002, p. 173, Figure 7)

Figure 2. Schematic representation of *The man lost the cat*.

the CG model accommodates a cognitive representation for both ‘search’ and ‘non-search’ construals quite economically.

A similar schema can be proposed for [LOSE], as in, *The man lost the cat*, represented in Figure 2. Here, the ‘search/aware’ ellipse in the final stage occurs only with *the man* (*tr*) due to the lack of perception of *the cat* (*lm*), i.e. [[LOSE]-[CAT]]. The (*tr*) is, however, conscious of that fact, i.e., *he knows that he lost the cat*. The dotted ellipse in the first time frame (left side) represents this knowledge, i.e., *the man* was aware of *the cat* at an earlier point in time, and recognizes this fact in the present, **at which point** *the cat* becomes *lost*. More generally for [LOSE], an *lm* cannot be [LOST] until the *tr* realizes that the *lm* is no longer in perceptual contact⁷.

Taking these schematic representations of [FIND] and [LOSE] as a starting point, discussion of how reflexive predications are construed within this schematic representation are presented.

2.1.1 CG and [FIND + *x-self*]⁸

Are the schemata discussed above applicable to every case of [FIND] and [LOSE] where both the *tr* and *lm* are predicated? As expected, this is not the case. One difference emerges when the *tr* and *lm* refer to the same entity, i.e. the reflexive event.

⁷ Notice that this is a different conception from that of the *lm* knowing that it itself is *lost*. In one case, the more likely construal is that of *tr* occurring in an intransitive event (i.e., *The cat is lost*, i.e., it cannot find its way home.) In another case, the *tr* has intentionally run away, and is therefore not *lost* (from its own perspective). However, with regard to *The man lost the cat* from the perspective of the *tr*, these scenarios may be identical iff the *tr* believes that the *cat* has not intentionally run away.

⁸ ‘*x-self*’ refers generically to the English reflexive pronouns ; *myself*, *yourself*, etc. used specifically with reflexive meaning, excluding intensifying, benefactive and logophoric meanings.

6. *Deliberately, he pinched himself on the thigh.*
(COCA : 1996.FIC.FantasySciFi)
7. *Did you see yourself in the mirror lately?*
(COCA : 2011.FIC.IndianaCurrents)
8. *But afterwards, I found myself in the dim bathroom...*
(BNC : APC.W_misc)

How can these cases be schematically represented? In the simplest of schemata, a semi-circular line connects the *tr* and *lm*, showing the relation between the pronoun and antecedent. Another possibility is a connection that starts from the *tr* and returns upon itself, forming a circle (cf. Kemmer, 1993, p. 71 ; R.W. Langacker, 2006, p. 368). These are useful for representing the basic reflexive situation in (6) and (7) ; however, this cannot account for the semantic complexity of the event in (8), even though they are predicated similarly. In particular, there is no reference to the main focus of the construal, i.e. *Self-Awareness of a specified perception/experience*. The schematic arc line and circle account for simple reflexivity, but not for the metaphoricity and ‘Subjectivity’ (Ronald W Langacker, 1990) of SA events.

‘Subjectivity’ is a subtle phenomenon that describes a tripartite relationship between the speaker, hearer, and the conception being conveyed. It concerns the conceptual ‘stance’ of a predication, the mostly implicit ‘viewpoint’ from which the speaker codes meaning into a message and from which the hearer decodes that message. The conceptualizer creates meaning from a particular ‘stance’ that may totally exclude the conceptualizer, such as *The boy walks the dog*, or one that is greatly included in the conception, i.e., *I thought I would walk the dog*. There are various facets of these examples that could be described here, but the main concern for this discussion is ‘Point of View’ (POV), i.e., the level to which the conceptualizer and/or his vantage point is explicitly involved in the construal.

According to Langacker, this ‘viewing relation’ or ‘Subjectification’ (Ronald W Langacker, 1985, 1990, 2002) states that any first or second person account of an event constitutes some level of subjectification on the part of the referent. Van Hoek’s (1997) explanation of ‘subjective’ reflexivity is provided in full :

The referent of the reflexive...is viewed semisubjectively *within the onstage region*. That is, some participant in the scene views him/herself semisubjectively. The semisubjective perception of the referent is part of the agent’s experience, part of the conception being put onstage rather than just part of the speaker and addressee. This viewing relation is maintained throughout most of the extensions from the reflexive prototype (1997, p. 175).

The ‘extensions’ referred to in the last line of the quotation, in my opinion, relate to SA events as well.⁹

One anecdote from the sport of golf might help clarify this. Proficient golfers have learned that when practicing, attention is paid to the mechanics of the swing : the stance, the rotation of the pelvis in relation to the spine and shoulder girdle, the angle of the arc of the swing, as well as the position of the ball, and numerous other factors. However, once involved in a game or tournament, the mechanical

⁹ Van Hoek does not account for SA events specifically. Her arguments aim only to distinguish between anaphoric and reflexive pronouns and their respective environments.

aspects fade into the background (if one is lucky), i.e., they become subconscious and automatic. The focus of attention is directed toward the targets (the fairway, green, and/or pin) and the object that needs to reach that target (the ball). Players ‘in the zone’ experience a total lack of SELF-reference and a complete goal-oriented mindset.¹⁰ This total ‘goal-oriented’ mindset can be equated with the ‘objective scene’ described in the *The boy walks the dog*. There is no explicit mention of the conceptualizer in the predication. It is an objective viewpoint — an ‘optimal viewing arrangement’ — where the conceptualizer remains ‘offstage’, as it were (Ronald W. Langacker, 1985 ; R.W. Langacker, 2006). On the other hand, *I thought I would walk the dog* represents a more subjective viewpoint, an ‘egocentric viewing arrangement’ (ibid.) in which the conceptualizer (and possibly the conception itself) is explicit and focused on, i.e. put ‘onstage’.

Various levels or degrees are present between these extremes, Langacker claiming at least five (2008). Due to space constraints, however, only those which are directly relevant to SA construal and predication will be discussed here. Specifically, SA construal represents a non-displaced¹¹ egocentric viewing relation in which the S (conceptualizer) is at maximum Subjectification. “The observer S is thus situated within the boundaries of this more extensive objective scene, reflecting the fact that S is no longer simply an observer, but also to some degree an object of observation. SELF-consciousness therefore attenuates the subjective/objective distinction” (Ronald W Langacker, 1985, p. 122). The following examples elucidate the difference between a simple Subjective schema and an SA schema, represented schematically in Figure 3.

- 9a. *I was in the hospital.*
 b. *I found myself in the hospital.*¹²

In Figure 3, the box labeled ‘H’ represents the conceptualizer placed inside a structure (e.g. Hospital). Since there is no processual element involved, no timeline appears below the schema. (9a) represents a viewing arrangement where the Ground (G) element (viewpoint of the conceptualizer S) is semi-subjective ; SELF is part of the conception (i.e., first person subject pronoun). It is also included within the ‘scope of predication’ (represented by dotted lines), i.e., it is ‘onstage’. In general, this is the conceptual basis for construal and predication of all first person predications.

In (9b), *I found myself in the hospital* represents a construal in which *Awareness* of the event (labeled S´) is ‘profiled’ by the conceptualizer (S). Because ‘Awareness’ (S´) is profiled, (even though both (S´) and (S) are put ‘onstage’), (S) loses its main profiled status (but keeps some hint of profile ; i.e., SELF is still part of ‘Awareness’). It remains linked to profiled (S´), predicated by way of the reflexive pronoun (construed metaphorically). In essence, the conceptualizer’s *Awareness* is put onstage as the profiled object of conceptualization, while the sub-event (*I was in the hospital*) no longer receives main profiling,

¹⁰ It is also the concept and construal for the SA event *lose x-self*, discussed later in this research.

¹¹ Displacement is described as an ‘alternate world’ in which the conceptualizer is present. This may be the form of a picture (see (Kuno, 1987 ; Panther et al., 2009, pp. 24-26)), theater performance, wax figure or some other form of ‘other-world’ scenario.

¹² Original examples are used in order to keep minimal pairs as simple as possible.

(although remaining within the scope of predication). A bold connecting line between S' and G' (ground for the *Aware* viewpoint) represents the 1st person conceptualizer as the one that *finds* the Ground. This relationship, in turn, relates to the sub-event (*in a hospital*), the solid arrow depicting this connection. The dotted arrow connecting the left and right components show that this is a processual relation, however momentary that process may be. [FIND], as a process, includes a time (t) element (outside the 'scope of predication' — i.e., an implicit reference point). Only the end result of the process is profiled, as discussed above for general instances of [FIND].

There is another construal for the predication of [FIND + *x-self*] that appears in the both the COCA and BNC corpora and must be addressed. In these cases, it is not 'awareness of perception' that is construed, but the 'awareness of a transcendental or deeper SELF', called the 'true-Self metaphor' (G. Lakoff, 1996)¹³. The difference between the two can be illustrated by (10) and (11) :

- 10. *I was travelling for 6 months...when I found myself in India.* (SA)
- 11. *I was meditating for 6 months...when I found myself in India.* (true-Self)

In (10), an SA event, the conceptualizer does not construe the SELF as a separate entity within the physical/mental confines of the first. The construal focuses on the *Awareness of the conceptualizer's perceptions/experiences*. In (11), however, a separate identity (i.e., Subject, or Essence) is *almost* literally found within the confines of the physical/mental SELF (ibid.) The difference in construal can be schematically and economically depicted using CG representations. (10) is represented in Figure 3, while (11) is shown in Figure 4, representing "...a detached outlook in which the speaker treats his own participation as being on par with anybody else's..." (Ronald W Langacker, 2002, p. 328). Thus, for the 'true-Self




Figure 3. CG model of the SA event : [FIND + *x-self*].

¹³ 0.5% of the 'true Self' metaphor occurred in random samples ($n = 200$ total, COCA and BNC), while SA events accounted for 98.5%.

metaphor', all roles of Subjectivity and Objectivity are construed as maximally egocentric. The dual roles of Subject of Perception (S) and Object of Perception (P) (i.e., SELF & SUBJECT as separate but interrelated entities) are represented as bold and grey circles which are onstage (OS), identified by the dotted square. The scene is processual (i.e., the verb FIND controls the scene), shown by the time line, but as with general cases of *find*, the profile is only the end result of the process. The dotted arc connecting the *tr* to the *lm* represents the reflexive event (Kemmer, 1993 ; Ronald W. Langacker, 1990). The stance from which the construal is conceived (S') is connected to the onstage construal by another dotted line, representing the scene as construed semi-subjectively from the offstage Ground (G), yielding the [[SELF] VIEWING [SUBJECT]] construal, a very different schema from that of Figure 3.




Figure 4. CG-inspired schema for the construal of 'true SELF metaphor', *I found myself* (based on (R.W. Langacker, 2006, p. 369)).

2.1.2 CG and [LOSE + *x-self*]

The schema for the SA event [LOSE + *x-self*] presents an interesting challenge :

12. *I lost myself in The Secret Garden, The Little Princess....*
(COCA : 1996.NEWS.USAToday)

In (12), the SA event [LOSE + *x-self*] includes the presupposition that at some previous moment in time, *Self-Awareness* was present. One cannot *lose something* one has never been aware of. Represented by the return arrow in the middle of Figure 5, past Awareness (the left portion of the diagram), although falling within the scope of predication, remains offstage (surrounded by dotted lines) for the conceptions of [SELF-AWARENESS] and [READ THE NOVELS], while only the relationship between the Conceptualizer (S') and the Ground (G') is profiled.

The final event (right portion of the diagram) of the timescale (bold, blunt-end line due to end-result profiling) represents the [LOSS OF SELF-AWARENESS] as the conceptualizer's (S') *Awareness* is totally absorbed *in the novels* (N) (but is not anymore¹⁴). The Ground (G') is profiled (SELF-AWARENESS is explicit) but is removed from the 'scope of predication' (small square dotted box), [SELF-

¹⁴ This is likely due to the nature of Awareness, i.e., that humans cannot be in the midst of [LOST AWARENESS] and simultaneously articulate that experience. To say, *I have now lost awareness* is an oxymoronic statement, for to be consciously articulating that mental state is to **not** be [LOST] in that state any longer.




Figure 5. CG-inspired schema for : SA : [[lose x-self] in (novels)].

AWARENESS] now being totally Subjective in viewpoint (i.e., ‘offstage’) and “serving only as a point of reference for situating those entities that attract the focus of viewing attention” (Ronald W Langacker, 1985, p. 124) ; it is *lost*, after all.

Because of the 1st person vantage point, however, the coreferential conceptualizer (S-S’) still maintains the profiling and onstage status. The conceptualizer construes an event that is no longer in progress, represented by the profiled blunt-end timeline, the left dot in the timeline representing the onset of *the loss of Self-Awareness* and the right dot representing the time of predication of the event, which is end-result oriented. Similar to Figure 3, a profiled bold connecting line between S’ and G’ represents the 1st person conceptualizer as the one who has *lost* the Ground. This relationship, in turn, refers to the sub-event being construed (i.e., *reading the romance novels*), a solid arrow depicting this conception.

Although CG schemata represent SA predications accurately, their descriptions can get cumbersome, especially when dealing with multi-level metaphors, [[FIND/LOSE] + x-self] included. For SA events, this complexity is due to the abstract nature of the nominals plus the absence of a predicated focus (i.e., *FIND x-self = Awareness*) as well as the conceptual presuppositions of certain verbs (i.e. [LOSE]).

2.2. The Divided Self and SA events

Another type of analysis proposes a distinct, semi-independent psyche, a phenomenon often called the ‘divided self’, where one part of the mind is ‘at odds’ with another part. This occurs especially for the reflexive causative construal, e.g., *I made myself go to the gym*.

Much research has been conducted on causative expressions since Talmy began to apply the notions of Force Dynamics onto linguistic construal (Talmy, 2001, 2003). The main tenets of this theory are : 1) objects (Agonists) can apply, block or remove physical and/or psychological force to/from other objects 2) objects (Antagonists) can have physical and/or psychological force applied or freed (blockage removed), 3) exertion of these forces is not binary but exist on a cline, and 4) the way we view the effects of force in a

particular situation is the way it is construed and predicated (Gilquin, 2010 ; Talmy, 2001, 2003). Applications of force dynamic principles to various types of linguistic construal and predication are ubiquitous ; “... the force-dynamic system in language is not limited to a small inventory of simplex patterns but has the property of open-ended generativity” (Talmy, 2001, p. 435) Force dynamics is proposed as the base or image schema for various causative constructions.

Due to space constraints, an in-depth analysis of causation will not be discussed here ; however, one specific point directly related to SA events will be presented. This is a subcategory of force dynamics called ‘Psychodynamics’ (Talmy, 2001) where a psychological force is exerted upon one or both of the participants in a construal. Within ‘psychodynamics’ is the specific case of reflexive constructions, called ‘coreferential causative constructions’ (Gilquin, 2010). For example,

13. *He held himself back from responding.*

14. *He exerted himself in pressing against the jammed door.* (Talmy, 2001, p. 432)

The ‘psychodynamic’ situations in (13) and (14) are intriguing. If force is applied from one object to another, what and how is this force manipulated during a reflexive event? It has been proposed that one part of the Self (a peripheral part) acts upon another part of the Self (a central part)¹⁵, in the phenomenon called ‘the divided self’ or similar phrases (A. Lakoff & Becker, 1992 ; G. Lakoff, 1996 ; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999 ; Ronald W Langacker, 1990 ; Talmy, 2003). The fundamental concept behind this phenomenon is a two-tier system comprised of the following (depending on one’s terminology) : Ego, Id, Subject, Super-ego and Self (Gilquin, 2010 ; Talmy, 2001), one of these being the ‘core’ or ‘center’ of consciousness and the other the ‘mundane’ or ‘peripheral’ action-based mind. In some cases, one part of the Self exerts force upon the physical body ; in other cases, the Self exerts control over another part of the psyche. Different levels and types of force can be exerted, and these guide the choice of construal and predication. Gilquin (2010) discusses the ‘divided self’ based on Talmy, and includes much detail as well as corpus evidence supporting her arguments. Being specifically a study of causation limits its applicability to SA event construal, however. The concepts construed for [FIND/LOSE + x-self] are very different from causative physical or psychological processes.

15. *Well, he looked and he looked until he found himself.*

(COCA : 1996.SPOK.ABC_Brinkley)

In (15), a part (‘peripheral’) of the SELF searches for another part (‘central’), and subsequently *finds* this part of the psyche that was perhaps psychologically hidden or underdeveloped. This construal adequately corroborates the ‘divided self’ phenomenon (without explicit causation). The construal can be represented as maximally egocentric, i.e., the Subject views the Self in the same way he would an inde-

¹⁵ Talmy uses the terms ‘peripheral’ and ‘central’ and to refer to general patterns of Agonistic/Antagonistic forces, respectively. The basic state of the ‘central’ part is ‘repose’ or inaction, while the ‘peripheral’ part ‘exerts’ the force. Many expressions contain construals that lend themselves to this kind of analysis, but it is proposed here that SA is not one of them.

pendent Object. However, (16) exemplifies a different construal :

16. ...*he was fond of people in whose company he found himself*...
(COCA : 1995.ACAD.AmerScholar)

In (16), although ‘divided SELVES’ seem to be predicated, the construal is a single entity, i.e. *SELF-AWARENESS of a certain perception/experience* (being *fond of people he was with*). There may be a minor, fleeting recognition of the ‘divided self’, but this must be subsequently denied in order to accurately comprehend the construal. It is along this parameter that the differences in meaning between (15) and (16) can be delineated.

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) examine the ‘divided self’ by way of the folk theory of ‘Essence’, whereby “...each person is seen as having an Essence that is part of the Subject (‘center’). The person may have more than one Self, but only one of those Selves is compatible with that Essence. This is called the “real” or “true” Self” (p. 242, my parenthesis). This explanation begins to untangle the metaphorical aspects of expressions in (15) and (16) but also in examples (17-19). The ‘divided-self’ is an insightful proposal that covers a vast number of metaphorical instances :

17. *And then when someone tells you the answer you kick yourself*.
(BNC : G1W.W_fict_prose)
18. *She gave herself time to regain her self-control...*
(BNC : GW3.W_fict_prose)
19. *But although I asked myself the question, I knew the answer.*
(BNC : H8G.W_fict_prose)

According to the ‘divided Self’ analysis, the Subject is the deeper, ‘central’ part of the Self, and the Self is the ‘peripheral’, actively changing aspect of the Self. In (17-19), *kick*, *gave*, and *ask* are metaphorically construed and occur within the [reflexive *x-self*] construction. The events’ total construal is contained therein, with no conceptual ‘bleeding’ into other parts of the predication. In other words, [non-SA verbs + reflexive *x-self*] are self-contained construals : *kick*, *gave*, and *asked* are not dependent on the following (or preceding) components for their meaning to be construed (except for general metaphoricity). In (17), one can *kick oneself* due to a variety of reasons and the metaphoric content does not change. In (18) one can *give oneself* an assortment of things in a range of situations and the metaphorical content of *give* remains unchanged. Similarly in (19), the metaphorical construal of *asking oneself* does not change according to the surrounding details. In all of these examples, the ‘divided-self’ phenomenon is construed ; they are self-contained construals comprised of [Subject - Self].

SA events such as (20) and (21), on the other hand, complicate matters :

20. ...*many parents find themselves facing a bureaucracy they don’t understand...*
(COCA : 2005.MAG.TodaysParent)

21. As he drives, *the older girl loses herself in thoughts of boys...*

(COCA : 2000.FIC.VirginiaQRev)

One complexity concerns the construal of the overall metaphor. In (17-19), the construals are congruent with the meanings of the predicates and pre- or post-*x-self* adjuncts do not affect the internal dynamics of the metaphors. However, the SA events in (20) and (21) expose the ‘divided-self’ explanation as incongruous. The ‘divided self’ and ‘true Self’ do not account for the idiosyncratic meaning of SA events.¹⁶ In SA events, the predicate is dependent on the post *x-self* adjunct (or pre-reflexive predications, in the case of fronted relative clauses) for its construal. Without its adjunct, in fact, the ‘true Self’ is the only metaphor recoverable. In (20), for example, *facing a bureaucracy* is the object of experiential Awareness, and is an obligatory part of the construal. It is specifically this *facing a bureaucracy* that the parents are aware of, without which, there is no object of Awareness, which is easily misconstrued for the ‘true Self’ metaphor, i.e., *The parents found themselves*. Similarly with (21), removing the object of awareness, *thoughts of boys*, SA events are misconstrued as ‘true Self’ metaphors (e.g., *the older girl loses herself*). The adjuncts are a vital part of the total conception and distinguish them as SA. One cannot simply *find oneself*, one must *find oneself + some situation or undergoing some experience*. Similarly one must *lose oneself + a perception or experience* in order for SA to be construed properly.

Self-Awareness is comprised of three sub-parts : 1) a stimulus, 2) perception of the stimulus, and 3) Awareness of the perception. They are bound together in one construal called *Self-Awareness*. Looking again at (20), *facing a bureaucracy* is the obligatory object of Awareness, not the SELF or SUBJECT. Attributing conceptual focus to either the SELF and/or SUBJECT leads again to a different and inaccurate construal. In other words, the primary meaning of the metaphor is the **Awareness** of some perception/experience, not the conception of two selves divided, although there is no denying its lesser role in the metaphor.

Thus, although the ‘divided-self’ phenomenon helps clarify many metaphorical reflexive events, SA events do not fall within its purview. Specifics of how SA events come to have the metaphorical meanings they do with the predications provided is the next point of discussion. How concepts are connected, i.e., ‘mapped’, is summarized with respect to two types of mapping, metaphoric and metonymic.

2.3. *Conceptual metaphor*

Clarification of the use of the term *metaphor* is a first necessary step towards proper analysis of SA events in relation to conceptual metaphor. The term metaphor, as it is used here, is *not* what is commonly known as ‘literary’ metaphor, often used in poetry, literature, art and drama. This is the purposeful, often idiosyncratic use of figurative language for dramatic and imagistic purposes. The term *metaphor* utilized here is often called *conceptual* metaphor (when referring to the underlying patterns of thought), or *linguistic metaphor* (when referring to the expression itself) (G. Lakoff & Johnson, 2008, p. 7). This type of metaphor occurs in natural language use. Its use is mainly unconscious, conceptual and grounded in human experience and culture (Deignan, 2005 ; Kovecses, 2002 ; G. Lakoff, 1990b,

¹⁶ Not to imply that they were meant to.

1993 ; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 2008 ; Panther et al., 2009 ; Yu, 2008). It has been proposed that the way we experience the world (both physically and mentally) as well as our culture affects the way we think and use language (Deignan, 2005 ; Gibbs Jr. & Steen, 1999).

The distinction between literary and conceptual metaphor is not as clear-cut as described above, however. The literary metaphors in the passage by Dante below are literary, but are also instances of conceptual metaphor, specifically, LIFE IS A JOURNEY¹⁷ and KNOWING IS SEEING (Deignan, 2005, 2008 ; G. Lakoff, 1993 ; Yu, 2008).

22. *In the middle of life's road*

I found myself in a dark wood.

(Dante Alighieri, "The Inferno", lines 1-3. In G. Lakoff, 1993, p. 237)

Lakoff (1993) explains that "*I found myself in a dark wood* evokes the knowledge that if it's dark you cannot see which way to go. This evokes the image of SEEING and the conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING...The experiential basis in this case is the fact that most of what we know comes through vision, and in the overwhelming majority of cases, if we see something, then we know it is true" (p. 240). Although the KNOWING IS SEEING conceptual metaphor, as related to the first and second lines of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, is warranted for the predication *dark wood*, in this particular case there is an additional analysis for line two that is just as pertinent to the intended meaning. The use of *I found myself* is a key component of the total construal here, if the translator's note (Alighieri, 2008) with regard to *dark wood* is taken into consideration : Dante's world was socially and politically controlled by the Church. 'Passions, vices and perplexities' were considered evil. (The conceptual metaphor DARK IS EVIL is also appropriate here). If SELF-AWARENESS is proposed as the meaning for '*I found myself...*' in the second line, with the interpretation of *I was suddenly aware (that I was surrounded by evil)*, it would certainly convey Dante's well-known contempt for the unethical political situation of Church politics surrounding him at that time (Alighieri, 2008). This line of reasoning is further supported by lines 10-12 :

23. *I cannot well repeat how there I entered,*

So full was I of slumber at the moment

In which I abandoned the true way. (ibid., p. 1)

Dante writes metaphorically that he cannot say (i.e., *he doesn't know*) how he got to that place (*dark wood*) because he was metaphorically 'so full of slumber at the moment' (i.e. *unaware*). Furthermore, the *true way* in line three most certainly refers to the Catholic righteous path of moral and ethical behavior. Thus, the construal conveys Dante's *sudden awareness* of the unethical state of affairs surrounding him. He chooses the expression *I found myself within a dark wood*, to imply that *he was previously unaware of this situation, but has now become aware of it*. Furthermore, he is now *fully aware* of this situ-

¹⁷ The conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY in relation to Dante's Inferno will not be discussed here due to space constraints, but the analysis by Lakoff seems warranted.

ation and he wants the reader(s) to know this. In contrast, if he had chosen the sentence *I was in a dark wood*, the character might or might not have been aware of his own situation (even though the narrator is sure to be). The specific expression *I found myself in a dark wood* not only enriches the psyche of the character (he has knowledge of his own Point of View), but also helps deflect social responsibility away from the narrator/writer for possible heretical ideas against the Church that the character (and narrator) may have held. Thus, the construal of the Self-Aware conceptual metaphor [FINDING ONESELF IS AWARENESS OF SELF] in the first stanza is vital to the deeper interpretation of the poem as a whole. In sum, literary metaphors are often used as tools for specific imagistic purposes, but conceptual metaphors are also used throughout literature (Gibbs, 1994 ; Kövecses, 2010 ; G. Lakoff & Turner, 2009).

What exactly is a metaphor? There are many variations and levels of specificity regarding a definition of metaphor. “A metaphor is a word or expression that is used to talk about an entity or quality other than that referred to by its core, or most basic meaning. This non-core use expresses a perceived relationship with the core meaning of the word, and in many cases between two semantic fields” (Deignan, 2005, p. 34). This definition is accurate in that it captures the general functions and structures of metaphor, i.e., its *non-core use*, along with the establishment of a *relationship* between the meanings of a word along with the concept of *semantic field*. However, how does one define and delineate what is *core* and *basic* what is not? If these are based on prototypes, how exactly are these prototypes delineated? What is a *semantic field* and what is its composition? This definition lacks the specificity needed to analyze the precise components of metaphorical expressions, including SA events. Cameron (2008) provides a more precise definition. “Linguistic metaphor is identified through the use of words or phrases that are potentially linked to a vehicle (or source) domain which is distinct from the domain of the surrounding, ongoing talk (a topic or target)” (p. 198). The term *linking of domains* is found (in one form or another) in other cognitive linguistic definitions of metaphor as well (Bartsch, 2002 ; *ibid.* ; Deignan, 2008 ; Dirven, 2002 ; Gibbs Jr, 2008 ; e.g., Kövecses, 2002 ; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 2008 ; G. Lakoff & Turner, 2009 ; Warren, 2002). However, due to the subtleness of SA events, and in order to avoid as much ambiguity as possible, an even more specific definition of metaphor is necessary. Therefore, the definition by Barcelona (2002), utilized in this discussion, is presented in full :

Metaphor is the cognitive mechanism whereby one experiential domain...is partially mapped onto a different experiential domain, the second domain being partially understood in terms of the first one. The domain that is mapped is called the source or donor domain, and the domain onto which it is mapped, is called the target or recipient domain. Both domains have to belong to different superordinate domains. (Barcelona, 2002, p. 211)

The specificity of Barcelona’s definition is useful, but questions remain : What is a mapping and why is the mapping only partial? What is a superordinate domain and why do the domains need to be separate? By investigating these specific concerns, SA events can be accurately analyzed from the stance of conceptual metaphor.

2.4. Mapping of Metaphor

In cognitive linguistics, the term *mapping* is used to describe the specific relationship between two or more concepts. Regarding metaphoric expressions, it describes a concept from one domain being *related to* a concept of another domain¹⁸ (Barcelona, 2000, 2002 ; Croft, 2002 ; Kovecses, 2002 ; Kövecses, Palmer, & Dirven, 2003 ; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 2008 ; Panther & Thornburg, 2002). These domains may be basic or abstract, but the mapping usually proceeds in only one direction, from the concrete to the abstract category¹⁹ (Grady & Johnson, in Dirven & Pörings, 2002, p. 539 ; Littlemore, 2015). The term *source* (or *topic*) is used for a concept's foundational domain, i.e. the domain from which the concept is taken. The term *target* (or *vehicle*) is used for a domain whose concept is used in the predication. For example, *Sally is an angel* means that *Sally has angel-like qualities*. The speaker intends to convey that the qualities displayed by Sally such as compassion, joy, generosity, tenderness, etc., (i.e., *source domain concepts*), are *mapped onto* those conceived qualities usually (deemed by particular individuals or cultures) displayed by angels (*target domain concepts*). The mapping is only *partial* because there are many qualities that *angels* have besides those chosen ; for example, they have wings, halos, they are able to fly, they are messengers from God, etc. In our understanding of the metaphor above, we do not *map* wings, halos, etc. onto *Sally*. *Sally* has a limited number of traits from the source domain,²⁰ but not all of them, because if the mapping were absolute, the concepts would be identical and thus be individually unrecognizable.

Looking at specific cases of conceptual mapping for SA events, the first, KNOWING IS SEEING (G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), represents a very well-known metaphor. This is instantiated by :

24. *I see what you mean.* (COCA : 2011.SPOK.CNN.Behar)²¹

With regard to SA events, one cannot *FIND* what one does not *SEE*, a natural extension of (24) being the metaphor FINDING IS KNOWING, and can be instantiated by numerous examples such as :

25. *So many people find it very very difficult...*
(BNC : G3VS_classroom)
26. *...Students found this exercise helpful...*
(COCA : 2009.ACAD.CommCollegeR)

Furthermore, and very naturally, if FINDING IS KNOWING then LOSING IS HAVING KNOWN, which is also construed and predicated :

¹⁸ Although there are many terms for and subtle differences in the definition of 'domain', in general terms, it can be described as a group of interrelated concepts that form a loose conceptual network from which meaning is construed.

¹⁹ As opposed to metonymy, which "are in general reversible" (Barcelona, 2000 ; G. Lakoff, 1990a).

²⁰ See Lakoff for further details of metaphorical mapping especially with regards to conceptual constraints, i.e., the 'Invariance Hypothesis' (G. Lakoff, 1990a ; Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez, 2002)

²¹ In the COCA and BNC corpus combined, *n* = 190.

27. *Your generation has lost touch with solitude...*
(COCA : 2012.FIC.MassachRev)
28. *...the Government has lost sight of their stated aims...*
(BNC : K5D.W_news_other_report)
29. *...especially Charlotte lost patience with him.*
(BNC : KGPS_unclassified)

Using the words FIND to mean KNOW and LOSE to mean HAVING KNOWN are proposed to be the base conceptual metaphors for SA events.

30. *One night, I found myself at a party with Naomi Campbell...*
(COCA : 2012.SPOK.ABC_20/20)
31. *I lost myself in thoughts of meeting kind people...*
(COCA : 2008.FIC.Triquarterly)

In (30), a particular SELF-KNOWLEDGE (i.e. *Awareness* of being *at a party*) is being conveyed by *I found myself*, while in (31) a particular SELF-KNOWLEDGE that *was present but is no longer* is conveyed by *I lost myself* (i.e. *non-Awareness* of anything **except the conceptual focus**, i.e., *thoughts of meeting kind people*).

What specific kinds of KNOWLEDGE do SA events refer to? Two conceptual metaphors are needed to complete the logic of SELF-AWARENESS for SA events. One is THE MIND IS A CONTAINER FOR OBJECTS (G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) and the other is MENTAL STATES ARE OBJECTS (Yu, 2008). When we think of the mind, we imagine it as *a container that holds things* like ideas, dreams, hallucinations, theories, etc. We imagine putting things *in the mind* as well as taking things *out of the mind*. For example, in (32) and (33) :

32. *I had other people in mind as well actually.*
(BNC : FM2.S_meeting)
33. *That's one of those things I think I blanked out of my mind.*
(COCA : 2012 : SPOK.ABC_20/20)
34. *His mental state has been very stable...*
(BNC : CBFW_newsp_other_report)
35. *...there are no fresh ideas on how to do it.*
(COCA : 2012 : SPOK.CBS_NewsEve)

The mind can also be in different states, and each of these can be thought of as some kind of object. For example, Emotions can be light or heavy, Ideas can be stale or fresh, etc. Examples (34) and (35) show instances of the MENTAL STATES ARE OBJECTS conceptual metaphor.

In order for SA events to be able to convey SELF-AWARENESS, the above three metaphors need to work in collaboration : FINDING IS KNOWING, THE MIND IS A CONTAINER FOR OBJECTS, and

MENTAL STATES ARE OBJECTS. SA event metaphors can now be proposed as : FINDING ONE-SELF IS AWARENESS OF SELF and LOSING ONESELF IS LOSS OF AWARENESS OF SELF. The following steps in logic are needed for the SA event metaphor to function :

1. THE MIND IS A CONTAINER FOR OBJECTS
2. MENTAL STATES ARE OBJECTS
3. OBJECTS CAN BE FOUND OR LOST
4. SELF-AWARENESS IS A MENTAL STATE
5. Therefore, SELF-AWARENESS IS AN OBJECT THAT CAN BE FOUND OR LOST

This is not to say that every time an SA event occurs, the interlocutors consciously go through all five logical steps in order. What is proposed here is that encased (i.e., *entailed*) within the SA event construal is the subconscious logic of FIND/LOSE ONESELF as stated above ; it is immanent to the understanding of the metaphor.

2.5. *Mapping of Metonymy*

There is another type of mapping that plays a role in SA events. This is a mapping that happens within the same domain (i.e., *related ideas network*) and is called *metonymy* (Croft, 1993 ; Goossens, 2002 ; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 2008 ; Ronald W Langacker, 1987 ; Littlemore, 2015). It has often been cited as being referential in nature and therefore many definitions of metonymy include this referential aspect (Ronald W Langacker, 2009b). However, as Ruiz de Mendoza and Velasco (2002) point out, there are metonymies that are not strictly referential ; for example, *Mary is just another pretty face*, where *pretty face* does not directly refer to any one person's pretty face, but beauty in general. They claim that due to this type of construal, referentiality should be excluded from a general definition of metonymy. They propose an alternate explanation based on domain inclusion/exclusion, metonymy being the former and metaphor the latter. This is similar to Goossens' definition, "...the crucial difference between metonymy (and synecdoche) and metaphor is that in a metaphoric mapping two discrete domains are involved whereas in the metonymy, the mapping occurs within a single domain" (2002, p. 351). This definition is also concordant with others (Barcelona, 2000 ; Kovecses, 2006 ; Littlemore, 2015), and one which will be used in this discussion.

Mendoza and Velasco (2002) further characterize metonymy based on whether a specific characteristic of the concept is being *highlighted* within the domain (called *source-in-target*) or whether the domain as a whole (called *domain matrix*) is being used to *stand for* a particular member of that domain (called *target-in-source*). Langacker (2009b) calls this *highlighting* function *activation zone*, as well as traditionally labeled WHOLE FOR PART and PART FOR WHOLE (Feyaerts, 2000 ; Kovecses, 2002 ; G. Lakoff, 1990a, 1993 ; Littlemore, 2015).

36. *The ham sandwich wants his check.*
(Gibbs Jr, 2008, p. 22)

37. Lefty is on the right track. *Phil Mickelson hit a bit of a lull...*
(COCA : 2012.NEWS.Houston)

The underlined parts of (36) and (37) show metonymic construal of the PART FOR WHOLE (i.e., synecdoche) and WHOLE FOR PART types, respectively. In (36), *The ham sandwich* corresponds to a PART of the person as a WHOLE, specifically, the part that ordered *the ham sandwich* corresponding to the entire person. In (37), *Lefty* corresponds to a WHOLE group of people that display left-hand orientation and corresponds to a specific person (PART) who becomes an archetype.

The WHOLE FOR PART (i.e., ‘*target-in-source*’) metonymy is applicable to SA events. Here, the WHOLE person (predicated by the reflexive pronoun *myself, ourselves, etc...*) stands for a single PART of the person (the Mental State of Self-Awareness).

38. *The plane began to fall. Barry found himself stepping on the gas.*
(COCA 1998, FIC, Bk : WasItSomething)
39. *After 14 months of unemployment, he found himself lying drunk on the floor of a room...*
(COCA 1999. NEWS, Atlanta)
40. *...she basks in the sun and loses herself in reading about the mythic lives of the gods and goddesses.* (COCA 1997. FIC, BK : PassionDreamBook)
41. *...meant setting aside their identity in the outside world and (visitors to the Gallery) losing themselves in the art on the walls...* (COCA 2003. ACAD, ArtBulletin)

In (38-41), and all SA events, the reflexive pronoun does not refer to the whole person as with literal or other types of metaphorical instances such as (42) and (43) :

42. *Bernard Goldberg published a book titled 100 People Who Are Screwing Up America and I found myself listed as culprit number 80.*
(COCA 2011. ACAD, AmerScholar)
43. *Father, I fear I have badly lost myself in the woods.*
(COCA 2005. FIC, FantasySciFi)

The reflexive pronoun of SA events does not simply refer back to the antecedent in a one-to-one relationship, irrespective of its predication. If this were the case, we could not understand the metaphorical meaning of SA events as *Self-Awareness*. For SA events, the construal of the predicate as a whole, i.e., the contextual, online knowledge of the construal, dictates the referent of reflexive pronoun. In (38) and (39), what is *found* is not the physical person, not the gestalt psychological person, not the ‘true Self’ or similar entity. What is *found* is *Self-Awareness of a particular perception/experience*.

If the pronoun-antecedent relationship in SA events is not a one-to-one correspondence but relies on contextual knowledge to be understood, then a new way of looking at the phenomenon of metonymy emerges.

In recent years there has been something of a move towards more flexible, context-based approaches to metonymy. Rather than viewing metonymy simply as a ‘domain transfer’ or ‘domain highlighting’ process, there has also been much more of a focus on the role of context in metonymy interpretation and production ; individual metonymies cannot be seen as independent of what came before them and what will come after them in both the sentence and the text, and even in life more generally (Littlemore, 2015, p. 59).

A context-based approach is necessary for the delineation of SA events ; *both* metaphor and metonymy are present within one predication. Because of this complexity, two theories are presented as particularly relevant to SA events. The first is called ‘*metonymy within metaphor*’ (Goossens, 2002). The second is the distinction between ‘*target-in-source*’ and ‘*source-in-target*’ (Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez, 2002).

SA events are instances of what Goossens (2002) describes as *metonymy within metaphor*, which are cases in which metaphorical expressions include a ‘built-in metonymy’. Goossens uses the example *Shoot one’s mouth off*. Quoting in full :

The donor domain is the foolish or uncontrolled use of firearms : the foolish (and therefore potentially, though not intentionally, dangerous) use of a gun is mapped onto unthoughtful linguistic action. By integrating *mouth* into a scene relating to the use of firearms it is reinterpreted as having properties of a gun in the donor domain ; this is the metaphorisation in the donor domain. In the recipient domain, however, there is a first level of interpretation which amounts to something like “using one’s mouth foolishly,” in which *mouth* is a metonymy for *speech faculty*. Again the significance of the metonymy becomes clear, if one replaces *mouth* by parts of the body which are less or not functional in the act of speaking (such as *nose* or *eyes*) (Goossens, 2002, p. 364).

For SA, this ‘built-in’ metonymy is the tethering of the reflexive pronoun to the mental state of Self-Awareness. Without this basic-level metonymy, the metaphor as a whole cannot function. In fact, disregarding this metonymy (i.e., using the reflexive pronoun to mean something else) nullifies the intended conception. For example, if the reflexive pronoun is mapped onto the domain of Essence (from Lakoff, above), then the ‘true-Self’ metaphor emerges. If the reflexive pronoun is mapped onto some other concept, one’s picture in the paper, for example, then the ‘Awareness Condition on picture noun phrases’ (Kuno, 1987) phenomenon is construed.

‘*Target-in-source*’ metonymies include a *domain reduction* due to the highlighted feature (a type of conceptual narrowing) of the domain being central to the conception (Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez, 2002). SA events display these properties, *myself* standing for Self-Awareness (a part of one’s total self), as shown in Figure 6. In the target domain there is a first level interpretation of *Self-Awareness* in which the reflexive *x-self* is a metonym for the specific Mental State of *Self-Awareness*, and this drives the metaphor as a whole. In the source domain, the metaphor *a person finding an object* is mapped (*cross-domain*) on to *a person aware of self*. By integrating the metonymic reflexive *x-self* with *finding an object*, we get the metaphorical reading, FINDING THE SELF IS AWARENESS OF SELF. Without applying this met-




Figure 6. Mapping of SA according to “target-in-source” metonymy (based Ruiz de Mendoza and Velasco (2002))

onymic step, there is no target ‘anchor’ upon which the whole predication is to be based. Again, if the target domain is left empty or underspecified, then the gestalt *x-self* assumes meaning, resulting in the ‘true-SELF’ metaphor described previously. This is, I believe, the exact point of ambiguity when polysemous predications appear, as in (44a, b) :

44. *A year after the war began, I found myself in Madrid...*

(COCA : 2012.FIC.Analog)

- a. *SA event* : I was aware that I was in Madrid.
- b. *‘true-SELF’ metaphor* : I realized my true Self in Madrid.

The **context** is needed to derive the correct construal, providing the interlocutor with necessary conceptual information. Does *x-self* hold a metonymic relation to the Mental State of Self-Awareness (i.e., SA event), or are other Subjects and Selves construed? The context will advise the interlocutors on which is the most appropriate conception for the situation.

In sum, *metonymy-within-metaphor* as well as *target-in-source* metonymic analyses shed light on the delineation of SA events. SA events construe and predicate a metonymic sub-event, *X-SELF STANDS FOR MENTAL STATE OF SELF-AWARENESS*, encased within a larger metaphorical event, *FINDING ONESELF IS SELF-AWARENESS* and *LOSING ONESELF IS LOSS OF SELF-AWARENESS*.

3. Conclusions and Discussion

This research presented three Cognitive Linguistic views of metaphorical English reflexive expressions in the form of *find/lose x-self* that construe Self-Awareness. SA events were explained by way of Cognitive Grammar, Conceptual Metaphor theory, and *metonymy within metaphor* as well as *target-in-source* construal. SA events are represented by the conceptual metaphors [FINDING ONESELF IS SELF-AWARENESS] and [LOSING ONESELF IS LOSS OF SELF-AWARENESS]. Corpus examples from both the COCA and the BNC were used throughout the discussion.

Further research questions remain, however. Specifically, there are pragmatic factors (such as sen-

tential stress and intonation) that also seem to play a role in construal choice when polysemous predications do occur. Native and non-native speaker tests for these may reveal other processing functions necessary for metaphor creation and comprehension.

Another interesting line of inquiry is the relationship between the neuronal processes of self-awareness related to SA events. Others (Coulson, 2008 ; Feldman, 2008 ; G. Lakoff, 2008) have already begun this research for metaphor in general, and I believe it only a matter of time before specific research on the precise relationship between self-awareness and metaphor debuts. Self-awareness provides us the ability to examine not only our physical perceptions and experiences, but also our mental and emotional perceptions and experiences. Self-awareness is thus the first step in understanding, and any subsequent premeditated action (physical, mental, linguistic, etc.) must have its roots in this. It is my sincere hope that one day soon these relationships will be explored and understood in more depth.

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