Construal, Conception, and Predication of Awareness : A Preliminary Analysis

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Abstract

This research attempts to define, describe, and exemplify a subtle aspect of cognitive construal and linguistic conception in which Self-Awareness is foregrounded in perception and profiled in predication. This paper addresses the construal and conception of predications containing [verb + reflexive[-self]] in order to delineate a metaphorically extended group of verbs named Onstage Awareness (OA). These verbs are linked with the reflexive[-self] and profile a view of Self-Awareness that is a necessary component in its construal and conception. OA is aligned to what Langacker (1997, 2002) refers to as *"egocentric viewing arrangement"*, which is the active, onstage perspective of the Self. Examples from an online English corpus will show that conceptions of OA are prolific in American English.

Key words : Cognitive Grammar, reflexive, awareness, self, onstage, construal, conception, subjectivity, profile

This paper addresses the distribution and *construal* of predications containing [verb + reflexive [-*self*]] in order to delineate a Self-Aware component in the construct of a metaphorically extended category of verb hereafter referred to as *Onstage Awareness* (*OA*). Activated OA has *profiled* in its predication a view of *Self-Awareness* that is a necessary component in its *construal and conception*. Compare the following sentences :

(1) (a)   I was thinking of Jane.
     (b)   I realized that I was thinking of Jane.
     (c)   I found myself thinking of Jane.
     (d)   I lost myself in thoughts of Jane.

The conceptual difference between (1a) and (1b, c, d) is the act of realizing or being aware of a certain event. This effects changes in the focus of the predication from 'thinking' to 'realized'. In other words, 'realization' is now in the foreground of perception. Proceeding to (1c, d), we must first consider that the meanings of the predications cannot be taken literally. If we were to do so, two physical forms of the self would be necessary, one literally 'finding' or 'losing' the other, an improbability at best. We must

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interpret［found］and［lost］as metaphorical.　While in (1b), 'realizing' substantiates awareness of the given proposition 'thinking about Jane', sentences (1c, d) assume a perspectival shift of the Self construing the event.　*Awareness of the Self viewing the event* is now foregrounded (*profiled*) in the predication. This is the phenomenon called 'Onstage Awareness' (hereafter OA) that will be analyzed in this discussion.　Evidence from the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) will used as often as possible making evident that conceptions of *OA* are triggered by the reflexive［-*self*］and that they are prolific in American English.

Although sharing properties with that of the *Divided Self* (Talmy 1988, 2000), and the *Awareness Condition* (Kuno, 1987), OA is more aligned with Langacker (1997, 2002), who refers to an "*egocentric viewing arrangement*" which is the active, onstage perspective of the Self.　OA can be described more technically as the phenomenon where a prototypically *offstage* (unaware, background) Self is brought *onstage* (Aware, profiled), onto the *objective scene* (palette for creation and structure), making that Awareness available for commentary (Langacker, 1997).　The point stressed in this discussion is that OA **must** be integrated into the construal schema in order to satisfactorily explain the given phenomenon.

This discussion will proceed by reviewing the anaphoric reflexive in English ; specifically clarifying the difference between three polysemous '-self' forms, the *intensifying* or *emphatic*, the logophoric, and the *reflexive*.　A brief summary of the rules and constraints of modern English reflexives will then be presented.

In section two, a brief explanation of the theory of Force Dynamics (Talmy 1988, 2000), with particular emphasis on the concept of *Psychodynamics,* will be given.　Within that Psychodynamic framework, a specific description of［causative verb + reflexive］will be reviewed.　It will be shown that the notion of a Psychodynamic 'Divided Self' is helpful in understanding how one part of the mind may act upon another, thus providing the *a priori* step necessary to proceed with the present analysis.　It will be seen that the category of［causative verb + reflexive］is actually part of the larger, more basic OA construal. In other words, causative verbs, when coupled with their reflexives, are to be considered a sub-category of OA construal and conception.

Similarities and differences in the conception of Awareness presented by Kuno (1987) will then be shown to be beneficial in clarifying the image of Awareness and how this is conceptualized in language.　However, because Kuno's *Awareness Condition* has different practical goals and describes a different set of data, only immediately relevant arguments will be presented here.

Section three presents the theory of Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1993, 1997, 2002) and work done within this on anaphor and reflexives (Gilquin 2006, 2010).　These studies provide analyses of the notions of *subjectivity* and *egocentric viewing arrangement*, which will be seen to accurately and eloquently account for the construal of the metaphorical extensions that occur when［［OA-verb］+ reflexive ［-self］］interact.　However, it will be hypothesized that the OA construal must be present in the construct schema in order to account satisfactorily for the phenomenon.

Finally, section four presents corpus evidence for the hypothesis presented above.　It will be seen that American English speakers readily conceptualize and profile OA in the predication represented by ［OA-verb + reflexive［-self］］.　Consider the passage below by Lee :

　　　　"Although the distinction between Subject and Self is essentially a philosophical construct,

it is not arrived at in this case through abstract theorizing.　Rather, it is based on the observation of everyday ways of using English and on formal processes such as the selection of pronominal forms.　In acquiring these ways of talking and these rules of grammar, speakers of English have come to acquire a particular way of thinking about the human personality." (2001 : 112)

Before proceeding further, a comment about the term *Awareness* as used in this paper is necessary. LaBerge writes :

"The term *mind* points to a variety of functions of the brain – thinking, feeling, intending, perceiving, judging, and so on – whereas the term *mindfulness* or *attention* points to the characteristic way in which any of these functions can move to center stage...at any given moment." (1995 : 1)

LaBerge's terms *attentional* and *mindfulness* refer to the foregrounding of brain functioning at a particular moment in time.　This is a neuro-cognitive definition of awareness in which LaBerge presents a clear, precise case for attentional processing based on brain functioning.　The term *Awareness* here refers to this 'moving to center stage' of a higher-order cognition, where it is then conceptualized and (optionally) linguistically produced.　LaBerge uses the term *attentional* or *mindfulness*, and although synonymous, in this paper the term *Awareness* as used by Langacker (1997, 2002), Van Hoek (1997), Mace (2008), Smalley & Winston (2010) and H.H.　The Dalai Lama (1998) will be used here.　OA refers to *Awareness* that becomes the cognitive/linguistic focus and which is brought forth from a state of non-awareness.　An energetic force is necessary to bring this awareness about and a lack of sufficient reflective mental force renders the host unaware of momentary functioning even when various activities are automatically being performed (Bodhi 2000 ; Buddhaghosa 1991 ; Damasio 2010 ; Easwaran 2007a, 2007b ; Feurstein 2003 ; Patanjali 1990, 1992 ; Talmy 1988, 2000).　An example of this would be *absent-mindedness* while driving (arriving at a destination with no recollection of actually driving there) or being lost in daydreams while at work (but still managing to type a report).　Defining precisely what this energy consists of and its source is a fascinating topic of study and still a matter of discussion and debate within neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy, but is outside the scope of the present discussion.　Without this Self-Awareness, however, our minds would cease to be moved into reflective conceptualization.　We would simply be reactionary to external or internal stimuli or states of being.　This, of course, is also part of the functioning of our human minds, and we often act on this.　The physical flinch response we have when accidentally touching a flame and our fight-flight response to real external or perceived stressors are examples of this.　According to some psycho-philosophies such as Yoga, Buddhism and Hinduism, for example, the automatic, continuous stream of learned responses to external and internal stimuli from birth (or before) until the present, called *Samskara* in Sanskrit, is the bondage that perpetuates our suffering and which prevents us from becoming free and enlightened beings.[1]

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[1]　c.f. ; Bodhi, 2000 ; Buddhaghosa, 1991 ; Damasio, 2010 ; Easwaran, 2007a, 2007b ; Feurstein, 2003 ; Patanjali, 1990, 1992.

My point here is that OA is a base reflective stance that can be utilized to view one's own conceptual functioning (i.e., functioning put onstage) affecting choice of linguistic structure related to that specific meaning intention.

Section I : Reflexives

Throughout the history of the English language various structural and semantic strategies were used to describe anaphoric relations between two semantic arguments or syntactic structures (Helke 1979 ; Lange 2004 ; van Gelderen 2000 ; Gast 2006 ; Konig and Gast 2008).　In Old English, subject personal pronouns were also used in object position for reflexive meaning.　As one can imagine, ambiguity between arguments ensued (Lange 2004).　Probably due to this ambiguity, the formerly independent pronoun SELF was morphologically added to object pronouns to disambiguate the arguments of the predicate, thus clarifying the reflexive form.　This continued throughout Middle English and into the present day (Lange 2004 ; van Gelderen 2000).　A detailed history and analyses of different evaluations of these changes is beyond the scope of this paper, so let it suffice here to say that language, being synchronically adaptable and malleable to its hosts' needs and desires, creates opportunities both for semantic clarification and ambiguity.　The reflexive［-self］form in Present Day English (PDE) has again come into a condition of polysemy and potential ambiguity, were it not for the mutually exclusive syntactic and semantic distribution of each (Konig and Gast 2008).　In PDE there are i) reflexive anaphors, i.e. reflexive pronouns used referentially, ii) intensifiers, which restate or intensify the strength of the nominal, and iii) logophoric or POV (point of view) markers, where "...some (conscious) entity from whose perspective a given state of affairs is reported or considered."[2]

The differences can be seen in the following examples :

(2)　(a)　Harold cut himself while slicing bread.
　　　(b)　Harold himself sliced the bread.
　　　(c)　Harold sliced the bread himself.

In sentence (2a), *himself* and *Harold* are *co-referents* (*reflexive*).　In (2b), *himself* is an intensifier, adding emphasis to the subject *Harold*.　The pronoun in (2c) is logophoric, providing a semantically clearer speaker point of view (ibid.)　In this paper, we are concerned with the reflexive use of the ［-self］pronoun.　Konig and Gast provide a definition :

"Reflexive pronouns (anaphors) are *self-forms* used in order to indicate that a semantic or a syntactic argument of a predicate is co-referent with another argument of the same predicate (a co-argument), typically with the subject.　This co-argument is called the antecedent of the

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[2]　Gast, Volker.　http://www.personal.uni-jena.de/~mu65qev/papdf/logoself.pdf

reflexive pronoun."[3]

Konig and Gast (ibid.) discuss another type of reflexive that they claim is not in fact co-referent with the subject predicate, but an example of raising (where an argument of an embedded predicate gets raised out of it bondage to become free-standing.)   They conclude that although the -*self* forms in the examples below are syntactically direct objects, semantically they are not antecedent with the main predicate but with the object clauses themselves.   They give two examples of this :

(3)　(a)　*John considers* himself *to be the perfect candidate*.
　　　(b)　*Suddenly I found* myself *in a large cave*.

The semantic explanation of (3b) is mentioned only as "what the speaker suddenly found in (3b) is his or her presence in a large cave." (ibid : 3)   This description does not satisfactorily account for the semantics of the above sentences.   It is, however, fortuitous that they present the above examples.   As I have introduced earlier in the discussion and will present in more detail below, deeper investigation into〔verb + reflexive〔-self〕〕reveals a construal that can more thoroughly be explained once the concept of OA is fleshed out.

Kuno presents a *Semantic Constraint on Reflexives* as :

"A〔+ reflexive〕NP that ends with –*self* /-*selves* can be used in English if and only if its referent is the direct recipient or target of the actions or mental states represented by the sentences." (1987 : 68)

Compare the above with Dixon who presents a definition of reflexives and its governance :

"If an NP following the predicate (either an object or an NP introduced by a preposition) has the same reference as the subject NP within the same clause, then the post-predicate NP must be replaced by the appropriate reflexive pronoun...However, if two NPs are coreferential between different clauses in a single sentence then a reflexive pronoun is not applicable..." (2005 : 62)

The explanations above seem different, but are similar in their attempt to semantically describe and explain the anaphoric-reflexive phenomenon in its syntactic environment.   Let us compare the above with the Cognitive Grammar account of reflexives given by Van Hoek :

"...*the reflexive codes a landmark of the verb which corresponds with the trajector...The prototypical reflexive construction profiles a process with an agent and patient, which correspond...The*

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[3]　Konig & Gast.　http://www.personal.uni-jena.de/~mu65qev/papdf/zaa.pdf

reflexive pronoun itself profiles the landmark in that relation" (1997 : 173-174)

In short, a reflexive pronoun refers to, is restricted by, and co-occurs with its antecedent. The reflexive pronoun also co-occurs with its predicate. The arguments of the predicate are both dependent upon their predicate for contextual meaning. This truly semantic explanation provides a framework from which to work. That the meaning of the predication is based not on each of its individual parts, but on its *context* and the *relations* of each of its parts is they key element in explaining how some verbs can assume metaphorical senses when co-occurring with other semantic elements in a phrase, sentence or discourse. However, if we are to find an adequate account of the Self in instances of ［OA-verb + reflexive］, we need a framework of linguistic conception that can accommodate a description of the Self and its related components. The above explanations cannot yet provide such a framework, so we will need to look elsewhere.

Section II : Force Dynamics and Functional Syntax

The theory of *Force Dynamics* (Talmy 1988, 2000 ; Gilquin 2006, 2010) describes the nature of linguistic causation as being grounded in properties of force occurring in the natural world which are then mentally conceived. A ball rolling down a hill, a person opening a door, the earth in its gravitational relation to the sun and moon... all of these are exerting a force or having the effects of force being acted upon them. An entity exerts a force and this force is intrinsic. The force is either toward motion or toward rest, that is to say, toward action or toward inaction. These forces have relative strengths, either stronger or weaker than the other. There is also a resultant of that force exerted upon one or the other. Two different types of causation patterns occur : the first is where an *Agonist* with the intrinsic tendency towards rest is opposed by a stronger *Antagonist* and the Antagonist overcomes the Agonist's resistance, forcing the Agonist to move. The second type is where the Agonist has a tendency towards motion and the Antagonist blocks the movement ; the Agonist is kept in place (Talmy 1988).

> "Overall, force dynamics thus emerges as a fundamental notional system that structures conceptual material pertaining to force interaction in a common way across a linguistic range : the physical, psychological, social, inferential, discourse, and mental-model domains of reference and conception." (Talmy 2000 : 410)

Within Force Dynamics, the notion of *Psychodynamics* is particularly insightful for the present discussion. Psychodynamics describes the possibility of having one part of the Self acting on another, called the *Self Divided*. It is argued that the Force Dynamic relationship holds true whether the anaphoric agents (different parts of the same Self, in this case) are Antagonist or Agonist, and/or whether the force is *onset* (sudden) or *sustained* (extended through time) (Talmy 2000 ; Gilquin 2006, 2010). In the sentence "*Jenny made herself go to the gym.*", one part of Jenny made another part of Jenny '*go to the gym*'. But which of Jenny's parts is the Agonist and which the Antagonist ? Talmy states,

"...one basic state of the central part of the psyche, perhaps its most basic (or 'unmarked') state, is that of *repose*. In this state, the central force element of the psyche has an intrinsic tendency toward rest that must be overcome by a more peripheral part of the psyche for energy to be expanded. Without such spurring, no effort would be exerted..." (2001.1 : 72-73)

Although still a matter under investigation, whether the core of the mind is naturally in repose or active is not vitally important here. What I would like to stress is that it takes a force of energy to initiate movement in the psyche. Even if Yogis, in their experiential research of the Self over the last five millennia are proven correct and the core of the mundane psyche (as opposed to the transcendental psyche) is in constant motion[4] and not *in repose* as stated above, an energetic force is still necessary to direct that energy from one point of the mind to another. That movement of energy is also necessary for Awareness to be perceived, conceptualized or schematized (conception of symbolic thought representing the event), and to be linguistically utilizable as a predication (which is not intrinsically necessary, although which without, would be unknowable to others).

    (5)   *Jorge made himself sit down and study*.

In sum, when a construction such as (5) is produced, a force exertion affecting two parts of the psyche is present : an Antagonist which exerts its intrinsic force '*to sit down and study*' on the Agonist, who resists but is overcome by the strength of the Antagonist, the result being that '*Jorge sat down and studied*'. This unconscious yet applicable knowledge of the speaker's own psyche allows him/her to construe, conceptualize, and produce the predication such as it is. This knowledge will provide useful when exploring the construal and conception of OA later on in the discussion.

Staying within the Force Dynamics theory, the notions '*onset*' and '*sustained*' are also applicable to OA predications. 'Onset' refers to a sudden action or exertion, whereas 'sustained' refers to a gradual exertion of force energy. As will be seen in more detail below, OA can also come into being suddenly or gradually, as the following examples show :

    (6)   (a)   ... when **suddenly** he *found himself* in an interrogation room answering questions about murder.

<div align="right"><COCA2012#5 : SPOK : NBCDateline></div>

        (b)   ... I had no idea that I could *lose myself* **so quickly**, so easily.

<div align="right"><COCA1998#54 : FIC : OffOurBacks></div>

        (c)   Underground Atlanta, which **continually** tries to *reinvent itself*, is losing its popular World of Coke neighbor.

<div align="right"><COCA2006#24 : NewsAtlanta></div>

Being more specific to the *Psychodynamic* hypothesis, Gilquin describes in detail '*coreferential caus-*

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[4] c.f., The Upanishads, the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali, the Hatha Yoga Pradipika, The Bhagavad Gita, The Buddha Abhidhamma, The Buddha Visuddhimagga, etc...

ative constructions', a situation within the frame of causation in which the *Causer* (Antagonist) and *Causee* (Agonist) are one and the same agent, albeit different psychological parts of that agent (2006 : 38). Gilquin gives an example from the International Corpus of English, Great Britain (ICE-GB) :

(7)　"She made herself drink the rest of the coffee, though it was cold."

<div align="right"><ICE-GB : W2F-020 #75 : 1>　(Gilquin 2006 : 39)</div>

Similar to example (5), sentence (7) expresses the *Antagonist* '*she*' as exerting force on the *Agonist* '*herself*' to have an *effect* '*drink*' on the *patient* '*coffee*'.　Comparing a few OA examples from the COCA corpus, can we project the same kind of force exertion on the referents ?

(8)　(a)　All I know is I'm suddenly *finding myself* standing naked in the kitchen...

<div align="right"><COCA2009#10 : FIC : AntiocRev></div>

　　　(b)　And so he leads us all back downhill in a terrible hurry, sometimes *forgetting himself* and hopping like a boy down the steps of the steepest streets.

<div align="right"><COCA2008#22 : FIC : Bk : NightBattles></div>

　　　(c)　...he will get relaxed, perhaps playing a little Play Station Vita.　Then he will *lose himself* in rap songs by Waka Flocka Flame...

<div align="right"><COCA2012#21 : News : Denver></div>

　　　(d)　"...and now I'm back in the swing of things."　She *surprised herself* by adding, "Wonderful memories can't be so bad."

<div align="right"><COCA2012#2 : FIC : Bk : DarknessBound></div>

　　　The sentences in (8a-d) conceptualize a different kind of force energy from that of the causation energy of Talmy and Gilquin above.　We still get a sense for the psychodynamic split of Self, but the energy exerted is now of a different nature.　Instead of one part of the Self exerting force on another part, one part of the Self is now exerting a force to become ***aware*** of another part of the Self.　It is as if the 'spotlight' of awareness has been switched on (8a, d) or off (8b, c) and turned in upon itself.　Furthermore, it is proposed here that Awareness is *basic* to the category of psychodynamic coreferential causation.　Awareness may very well be, in Lakoff's (1987) terms, a *conceptually embodied* categorization, meaning that the concept is ingrained in our bodies, minds, and emotions on a fundamental human level. Awareness is the precursory factor which allows one part of the self to 'exert effort that leads to action' on another part(s) of the self – the Causer in (7) exerting a force on the Causee.　Although it is possible for '*her to drink the cold coffee*' in (7) without active Awareness, it is highly unlikely that the particular predication nor the psychology driving it would be chosen to express the way in which the cold liquid was imbibed.　It would more likely be expressed something similar to :

(9)　She drank the rest of the cold coffee.

The construction in (9) would allow for the same basic interpretation as (7) but without the active Aware-

ness component.　If Awareness is indeed fundamental to psychodynamic co-reference, we must ask if it is possible to have psychodynamic co-reference without it ?　And if so, what might that construction look like ?　It is structurally possible but semantically dubious.　Structurally, if the act of being *non-aware* were focused on and lexicalized as in (10a-c), where Awareness is specifically not integrated into the conception, it may look something like :

(10)　(a)　? She unconsciously made herself drink the cold coffee.
　　　(b)　? She was unaware of making herself drink the coffee.
　　　(c)　? She was unaware of drinking the cold coffee, even though she did not like it.
　　　(d)　She consciously made herself drink the cold coffee.
　　　(e)　She was (totally, absolutely...) aware of making herself drink the coffee.

Conversely, sentences (10d, e) exemplify a perfectly legitimate lexicalized predication with an Aware agent, showing that the decision for one part of the Self to exert a force on another part of the Self in order to effect an outcome **necessitates** that one must have Awareness of those parts of Self.

To summarize the main points of this section :

1. Awareness is a more basic-level construal than the Psychodynamic Divided Self.
2. Temporal aspects of force (*onset* and *sustained*) are applicable to Awareness ; **therefore** (because of #1 above) it is natural (but not obligatory) that temporal aspects be applicable to coreferential causatives as well.

A further analysis of Awareness and specifically OA will follow, but my goal in this section was to clarify that a force energy is needed to effect a change in the psyche, be it a causative force or change in viewpoint.　Coreferential causation within Psychodynamics was shown to be subordinate to Awareness in its construal and conception, thus, they share schematic qualities which affect these divisions of Self.

Functional Syntax :
　　Kuno (1987) discusses at length the semantic categorization and description of anaphora and reflexives, in particular and in opposition to Chomsky's Government and Binding Theory, refuting its sole reign over the grammatical explanation of anaphora.　Due to the different focus of that work, I will present here only the essential elements related to the present topic.
　　I will begin by restating Kuno's *Semantic Constraint of Reflexives* :

"A [+ reflexive] NP that ends with -self/-selves can be used in English if and only if its referent is the direct recipient or target of the actions or mental states represented by the sentence." (1987 : 68)

Note that by this account, the referent is the recipient or target of the action (*patient*), without any

mention of an agentive, active NP.　Deane defends this by stating, "since the agent and patient are one and the same, the only natural viewpoint to take on reflexive action is that of the agent." (1992 : 211) Whether or not this is a "natural viewpoint" is arguable.　Although there is undeniably an antecedent-referent correspondence that is construed, the agent/patient status of each one is ambiguous without any overt markers.　In the case of prototypical reflexive constructions, however, this explanation may be satisfactory, as in (11) :

(11)　John cut himself with a knife.

But the above rule seems to weaken under the weight of OA metaphoric extensions :

(12)　John found himself with a knife.

In example (12), if we use Kuno's analysis that the 'referent is the target of the action or mental state', *John* is the recipient of the action '*found with a knife*'.　But is this the meaning of the predication ? Without mention of a conceptual "'Awareness' of action", (which is the profiled, focus of the predication), we are left with a semantically empty shell of a syntactic construction, exactly the type of argument Kuno opposes.　If this Awareness were not in fact conceptual, then '*John has a knife which he possesses*' would be synonymous with sentence (12).　However, this is not so.　'*John's is now **Aware** of his possession of a knife*' is a more accurate representation of the construal.

Kuno does, however, present an hypothesis of awareness, which he calls *Awareness Condition for Picture Noun Reflexives* :

"Use of a picture noun reflexive is obligatory if the referent of the reflexive perceived/perceives/will perceive the referent of the picture noun as one that involves him.　Use of a picture noun nonreflexive pronoun is obligatory otherwise.　The above constraint is the strongest if the awareness is concurrent with the action or state represented by the sentence, and weaker if the awareness is not concurrent with the reference time, but prior to it.　Concurrent Awarenesss > Prior Awareness > Nonawareness" (1987 : 166)

Observe the sentences below :

(13)　(a)　Silvia was handed a picture of herself.
　　　(b)　Nino told a story to Silvia about himself.
　　　(c)　*Nino was clueless about the article about himself.

Kuno observes that when a noun such as a picture, story, article, image, etc... is controlling two or more possible object NPs in a subordinate clause, *awareness of the referred-to picture* is a necessary ingredient for reflexivization.　Note example (13c) where lack of awareness blocks the reflexive.　Kuno and the present discussion both require Awareness as necessary for the proper meaning of reflexivization to be

construed.   However, the central meanings of *awareness* here are different.   Kuno's meaning of aware-
ness (small 'a') is limited to the *knowledge of an event* of oneself appearing in a given picture, article, etc...
The meaning of Awareness (capital 'A') in OA is a viewpoint of one's Self involved in an event ; in other
words, a reflective Self observing the active Self from the reflective Self's point of view.   It is this con-
strual and conception which becomes profiled in the predication.

Kuno discusses a concept called '*perception of the referent*'.   This *perception* is elaborated through a
notion called *Empathy Perspective* in which a similar logical proposition may be expressed in subtly differ-
ent ways by changing the "viewing perspective" of the referent.   Kuno also calls this viewing perspec-
tive 'camera angle'.   He defines this Empathy as :

> "...the speaker's identification, which may vary in degree, with a person/thing that partici-
> pates in the event or state that he describes in a sentence." (ibid : 206)

This identification is conceptualized by way of grammatical category such as Subject, Object, First-
person Pronouns, Indefinite Pronouns, etc... According to Kuno, there is a specific hierarchy that is
adhered to in regard to this and whether an NP can take a reflexive pronoun or not.   The stronger/closer
the referent and pronoun mutually feel (empathy), the more likely reflexivization will occur.   It is shown
that unacceptability judgments on reflexivity are due to faulty or vague hierarchical orderings of the vari-
ous empathy perspective guidelines.   In a nutshell, the stronger the empathic bond to the referent NP,
the more likely reflexives will be employed (ibid).   This is an insightful and well-documented work, but
is limited to awareness of the self in picture nouns and within which the viewpoint only determines the
grammatical class of referent nominals.

In this section, an analysis of relevant facets of Force Dynamics and Functional Syntax were pre-
sented to clarify similarities and differences that these theories have in dealing with aspects of the Self in
conceptualization and predication.   In the section below, a different type of linguistic theory will be pre-
sented that may be able to accommodate an idea of Self that is subtle but nonetheless relevant to the
choice and use of a particular linguistic structure.

Section III : Cognitive Grammar

> "A foundational claim of cognitive semantics is that an expression's meaning cannot be
> reduced to an objective characterization of the situation described : equally important for lin-
> guistic semantics is how the conceptualizer chooses to construe the situation and portray it for
> expressive purposes." (Langacker 2002 : 315)

When we are engaged in a conversation, we assume that what we think we are saying and what the
hearer thinks he/she is hearing are congruent.   In many cases, this couldn't be any farther from the
truth.   What we want to say and the way we construct the meaning of the sentence depends upon many
factors, some of which are unconscious.   Our current mood, the relationship we have (at that moment)
with the person with whom we are conversing, the time of day, memories of past conversations, speaking

patterns and many more factors combine in an infinite number of ways to create a meaning and the structure used to convey that meaning.　The same applies to the hearer and what is heard.　We bring our Selves into every aspect of language, and that Self is always changing and never a purely objective entity, no matter how hard we try.

This is the fundamental concept behind Cognitive Grammar (CG) (Langacker, 1993, 1997, 2002). Meaning cannot be divorced from the cognitive intent, environment, nor background knowledge of the cognizer.　Separating the Self from language description is analogous to explaining the taste of chocolate to an alien without taste buds ; no matter how hard you try, something always seems to be missing.

Because CG has been developing for a few decades and has been evidenced within and across various languages, it is difficult to explain its entirety in this short discussion.　I have made the decision, therefore, to limit my description to immediately relevant components of the theory at the possible expense of providing insufficient background information.　I urge readers who need more background to follow the trail of crumbs left in the reference section below.

One of the primary notions within the theory of CG is the relationship between *profile* and *base*. The *profile* is the idea to which linguistic structure is formed, while the *base* it its abstract, foundational *image* (also called *immediate scope*).　So, for example, if the word 'pencil' is profiled, its base would be 'writing instrument'.　Once the sentence is conceptualized, two other basic notions come into play ; *trajector* and *landmark*.　The trajector can be understood as the most prominent item in the scene (similar to the focus) and the landmark would then be the next-most prominent item in the scene.　This prominence is totally dependent upon the context of the utterance (Langacker, 2002).　As an example, the phrase, 'on the floor' contains two items, the preposition 'on' and the noun phrase 'the floor'.　Here, 'the floor' can be considered the foundation or setting for what is happening to it — something or someone being 'on' it.　Therefore, in this case 'on' takes prominence (the trajector) and its less prominent background scene (the landmark) is 'the floor'.　Specifically for the examples under discussion, these definitions are necessary to distinguish between the antecedent/referent (agent/patient, *arguments*) and the *process* (predicate, verb) of the construal.　Review the definition of reflexive constructions by Van Hoek :

"...*the reflexive codes a landmark of the verb which corresponds with the trajector...The prototypical reflexive construction profiles a process with an agent and patient, which correspond...The reflexive pronoun itself profiles the landmark in that relation*" (*1997 : 173-174*)

In other words, for a predication that contains a reflexive construction, there is some process that involves two participants (the actor and acted upon) and these are (physically) identical.　The reflexive ［-self］ is the less prominent of the two, but points directly to the most prominent one (the nominal) in that pair.　Van Hoek also explains in detail how the antecedent of the anaphor acts as a reference point for the reflexive pronoun, which "is viewed semi-subjectively within the onstage region." (ibid : 175).　This *point-of-view* describes the relationship of the nominal to its referent in a purely semantic framework, refuting the long-standing syntax-only approach to grammar so dominant in the history of modern linguistics.　Consider the following :

(14)　(a)　I found Jerry in Brooklyn.
　　　(b)　I found myself in Brooklyn.

(15)　(a)　I lost my watch in the crowded disco.
　　　(b)　I lost myself in the crowded disco.

(16)　(a)　I caught myself falling off the chair.
　　　(b)　I caught myself falling for her.

　　In the above examples, does is suffice to say that the reflexive pronoun refers to the subject NP of the same clause or even that the arguments of the predicate refer to parts of the Divided Self ?　The reality of a profiled, Self-Aware concept is necessary in order to account for the metaphorical extensions in examples (14b, 15b, and 16b).　The construal (pre-linguistic cognitive image) and conception (linguistic image tied to its construal) of 'finding, losing and catching' one's Self in the (a) sentences above are very different from the (b) sentences.　In each of the above (b) situations, the element of becoming Aware of one's Self in a particular situation from that perspective is crucial for full comprehension of the spoken intent.

　　CG addresses such a reality with discussion of *conceptualization*.　Conceptualization refers to the relationship between the non-conscious or conscious mental activity and how it effects the speaker's linguistic production (Langacker 1997).　The conception can be either subjectively or objectively construed, depending upon how involved the consciousness is in the profiled proposition.　In general, consciousness is not directly involved as the topic or focus of conversation ; it is usually hanging around in the background directing and guiding linguistic stream-of-thought.　However, one's consciousness can and may be involved when necessary, as Langacker explains :

　　"The essential point is that C's (conceptualizer's) entertaining of T (thought) does not imply that C is consciously aware of C, of C → T, or how C determines the specific nature of T.　Any such realization by C constitutes a higher-order thought T′, which refers to C → T in some fashion...C → T′, where T′ makes reference to C → T ...such awareness represents a higher level of conceptual organization : S → [...S→O...] O′."[5] (1997 : 51-54 : (my parentheses))

This is exemplified in the following sentence :

(17)　<u>I realized</u> that <u>I was thinking about her again</u>.
　　　S →　　　　　[S → O]　　　O′

In (17), an offstage, Subject of conception (S) is actively bringing a '*realized*' awareness (O′) onstage to take account of the already onstage Object of conception (O), '*I was thinking about her again*' (S → O).

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[5]　Langacker renames 'C' as 'S' (Subject of Conception) and 'T' as 'O' (Object of Conception).

Having 'awareness of oneself as a proposition' (similar to Kuno from above) and having 'awareness of oneself from the perspective within that proposition' (OA) is a different construal.　Langacker describes the latter as *egocentric viewing arrangement,* whereby,

> "people are sometimes concerned with themselves and the relationships they bear to other entities.　When this happens, V (viewer) may not only be self-aware...but can even go onstage, taking its place within an expanded, egocentrically determined OS (objective scene) region ; at the extreme, V can itself become the focus of viewing attention (V＝P)." (Langacker 2002 : 317 (my parentheses for first and second items.))

Also,

> "To clearly apprehend the separation between the two facets of the self would require a higher-order conceptualization with yet a third facet coming into play as the active center of consciousness : $S^* \rightarrow [S \rightarrow [\mathbf{S}]]$" (1987 : 59-60)

The above two quotations combine to form to a plausible explanation of OA, where the active center of egocentrically-viewed Awareness moves *onstage,* onto the Objective Scene (OS).　Consider sentences (18a,b) below :

(18)　(a)　Edgar <u>finds himself</u> alone with his thoughts.

<COCA2007#427 : FIC : Read>

　　　(b)　...I felt safe there, able, if only momentarily, to <u>lose myself</u> and forget the events of the past several weeks.

<COCA2005#80 : FIC : Callaloo>

In sentences (18a, b), if an accurate description of the proposition is to be given, an account of the Self and its relationship to the scene is necessary.　In other words, OA needs to be factored into the schematic formula, as in : $S \rightarrow [S^* [+\mathbf{OA}] \rightarrow [O]] O'$ in sentence (a) and $S \rightarrow [S^* [-\mathbf{OA}] \rightarrow [O]] O'$ for sentence (b).　These can be restated as : sentence (a)＝ Speaker's viewpoint $\rightarrow$ [Edgar (viewpoint) [+**Aware**] $\rightarrow$ [alone with his thoughts]] found himself, and sentence (b)＝ Speaker's viewpoint＝I $\rightarrow$ [I (viewpoint) [−**Aware**] $\rightarrow$ [able to forget events...]] lose myself.　To put this another way,

(19)　(a) : The Speaker view : [Edgar's **Self-awareness peaks** and constructs the view from Edgar's Self] Edgar (I) is alone with his (my) thoughts].

　　　(b) : I view : [My **Self non-awareness peaks** and constructs the view from my Self] I was able to forget the events...].

The **profiled** OA (in bold) is the force of becoming (+) or (−) Self-Aware, that is, the 'found' or 'lost' part of the Self just awakened (= Aware), able to construe something about another/other part(s) of the Self's situation. Various examples from the COCA corpus evidence that English speakers conceptualize this egocentric viewpoint. Consider the following :

> (20) (a) ...I <u>found myself</u> happily wandering the back roads of the professional polo circuit...
> <COCA1994#41 : MAG : RollingStones>
> (b) Rachel <u>found herself</u> grinning back and then laughing out loud.
> <COCA2008#45 : FIC : SatisfactionGuaranteed>
> (c) Once or twice a game he would <u>lose himself</u> in thought...
> <COCA2012#106 : FIC : IowaRev>
> (d) ...two things I've always been able to do are <u>lose myself</u> in work and <u>lose myself</u> in sleep.
> <COCA2005#211 : MAG : Entertainment>

Contained in the metaphorical senses of (20a-d) above, 'finding oneself' entails : i) being aware of a situation, ii) being Aware of one's Self in that situation iii) taking an active perspective from that 'Aware viewpoint' iv) conceptualizing that 'Aware viewpoint' and v) profiling the 'Aware viewpoint'. 'Losing oneself' also includes all of the above components, but differs in the (+)aware / (−)aware construal. To 'lose oneself', one is non-aware of a situation and then becomes aware of that 'non-aware Self' in that situation. So, to 'lose oneself' entails : i) being non-aware of a situation, ii) being Aware of the non-aware Self in that situation iii) taking an active perspective from that 'Aware viewpoint' iv) conceptualizing the 'Aware viewpoint' and v) profiling the 'Aware viewpoint'.

A definition of OA and its main components can now be summarized :

<u>Definition of OA</u> : 'Onstage Awareness' (OA) is a construal identified as an egocentrically-viewed Subject of conception that is Self-Aware, Onstage and active. It is conceptualized as a verb metaphorically extended to include a reflective view of the Self and is associated with its coreferential agent/patient in the form of reflexive[-self].

<u>OA Components</u> :
i) The Subject of conception (S) is (+)Aware / (−)Aware of an event (*x*).
ii) 'S' is Aware of its Self in event (*x*).
iii) 'S' assumes an active 'Aware viewpoint' in which to conceptualize the Self within event (*x*).
iv) *Awareness* is conceptualized and predicated as a metaphorical extension of a process associated with its coreferential agent/patient by way of the reflexive[-self] construction.
v) *Awareness* is profiled in the predication.

Section IV : Corpus Data and Analysis

Throughout the totality of this section and in selected examples from previous sections, an online database called the *Corpus of Contemporary American English* (*COCA*)[6] was used to search for authentic instances of [verb + -self]. Source categories included in COCA are *Spoken, Fiction, Magazine, Newspaper,* and *Academic*. For all data used in this discussion, arrow brackets after each example indicates the code for each sentence indicating : *<year of source (published or aired), number from retrieved list, source category, name of source>*.

For the purposes of this research, the database search criteria [v *] * *self* was employed, meaning that the COCA database was asked to search for any (asterisk) lemmatized[7] verb followed by any morpheme + -self. In this preliminary analysis, nine categories of OA-verb have been identified where the OA construal is possible. The chart provided in Appendix 1 is a precursory categorization of the OA-identified verbs. It should be noted here that OA is not an obligatory construct. The search index above provided many occurrences of non-OA data ; intensifying [-self] forms, literal uses of the verb, and metaphorical senses that did not elicit OA, for example. However, many verbs can clearly assume a metaphorical sense where OA is an obligatory construct and conception of the predication. This being a preliminary analysis, it is understood by the author that much more research needs to be done to uncover further subtleties and thoroughly clarify this complex issue.

List 1 shows the most frequently occurring verbs in pre-[-self] position, as well as the OA verbs [catch] and [lose] so often exemplified in the discussion.[8]

List 1 : Total occurrences and hits per million.[9]

#1 : [find] = 17,259 total occurrences : 37.19 per million
#2 : [tell] = 5,316 : 11.46
#3 : [make] = 4,588 : 10.42 (CAUSATIVE)
#4 : [see] = 3,930 : 8.77
#5 : [ask] = 3,563 : 7.94
#6 : [get] = 3,401 : 7.58 (CAUSATIVE)
#7 : [call] = 2,995 : 6.78
#8 : [kill] = 2,772 : 5.97 (CAUSATIVE)
#9 : [give] = 2,598 : 6.13
#10 : [put] = 2,544 : 5.68 (CAUSATIVE)
... [**catch**] = 1,005 : 2.17
... [**lose**] = 752 : 1.62

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[6] Davies, Mark. (2008-), The Corpus of Contemporary American English : 450 million words, 1990-presesnt. Available online at http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/

[7] A base form of a word regardless of case, tense, number, etc. surrounded by [brackets].

[8] These verbs are used for the ease in which OA conception can be visualized.

[9] Totals here were not screened for polysemous forms of -self or literal verb meaning.

Data reveals that the most frequent OA-verbs were heavily skewed in the FICTION category,[10] shown in *List 2*.

List 2 : Hits per million in the FICTION category.

［find］= 73.94 per mil (1.98x compared to average of all categories)
［tell］= 43.71 per mil (3.81x)
［see］= 15.78 per mil (1.79x)
［ask］= 11.56 per mil (1.45x)
［call］= 8.74 per mil (1.28x)
［give］= 11.38 per mil (1.85x)
［catch］= 8.16 per mil (2.92x)
［lose］= 4.74 per mil (3.76)

OA-verbs can take as complements/modifiers a physical location, a situation or a mental state, which is either gradually attained (*sustained*) or suddenly attained (*onset*),[11] referred to in sentences (21a–g) :

(21)　(a)　Instead, finding yourself in the right place at the right time.

<COCA1994#1 : MAG : OutdoorLife>

　　　(b)　On the first day, I found myself on high alert.

<COCA1996#14 : MAG : PsychToday>

　　　(c)　Continuous, repetitive motion allows you to lose yourself in the motion...

<COCA1996#1 : MAG : Prevention>

　　　(d)　When I tried, I eventually found myself once again on the 976-STEALTH line with Capt. Strednansky.　　　<COCA1990#63 : MAG : WashMonth>

　　　(e)　...Jordan appeared to be trying to lose himself in a round of golf in Chicago.

<COCA1993#93 : MAG : People>

　　　(f)　... and in that flicker of a moment I caught myself feeling the rocking...

<COCA1992#17 : FIC : Atlantic>

　　　(g)　I soon lost myself in the creaky rhythms of it.

<COCA1993#109 : MAG : FieldStream>

OA-verbs ［FIND］, ［LOSE］, and ［CATCH］ :
［FIND］
　　［FIND］ clearly occurred most frequently with 17,259 total hits (48.9% of total hits ; 37.19 per million).[12]　Non-OA occurrences such as literal interpretations and non-reflexive［-self］ forms were

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10)　［ASK］ was the only OA-verb in the top ten in which a different data category outweighed FICTION.　The category MAGAZINE held top position with 12.33 per mil.

11)　c.f., Talmy (1988, 2000) and Gilquin (2006, 2010) for an in-depth explanation of *onset* and *sustained* force within the Force Dynamics theory.

12)　On a private aside, this discovery was my motivation for the present research.　While searching the COCA

negligible (1.4%).

　〔FIND〕[13] can take gerundive, adverbial, or prepositional complements/modifiers, and these are often of a spatial or temporal construal, most likely due to alignment with the 'container' metaphor,[14] whereby literally 'being 'found' or 'lost' necessitates one must be located in some physical space.　This is extended to a 'metaphoric place' in a spatial, temporal, social or emotional field in which one can be 'mentally located.　See (22a–d) :

(22)　(a)　I found myself *sitting* <u>on</u> the ridgeback of a Stegasaurus.

<div align="right">＜COCA1999#7 : FIC : SouthwestRey＞</div>

　　　(b)　If she asks a cheapo ticket she may find herself *overbooked*...

<div align="right">＜COCA2010#5 : SPOK : CBSNewsMorn＞</div>

　　　(c)　Instead, finding yourself *in the right place at the right **time***...

<div align="right">＜COCA1994#1 : MAG : OutdoorLife＞</div>

　　　(d)　The lesson here is that if you find yourself *approaching* retirement age...

<div align="right">＜COCA2006#3 : NEWS : WashPost＞</div>

　When the reflexive is predication-final, the OA-verb assumes the metaphorical sense of 'knowing one's deeper, transcendental Self'.　In the data sample, there were 33 occurrences (3.3%) of this, shown by examples (23a,b) :

(23)　(a)　He was very happy.　You know, *he's found himself*.　He's finally let this incredible load, you know, off his...　　　＜COCA1993#250 : SPOK : ABC20/20＞

　　　(b)　Well, I'm sorry Fred, but *I had to find myself* first.　My head was just so far out there in wonderland.[15]　　　＜COCA2002#150 : SPOK : NBCDateline＞

　This metaphorical sense may also be triggered by stress on the OA-verb even when not in clause-final position.　An example of this is given below, where (24a) takes the metaphorical sense of 'finding oneself in a place or situation' and (24b) takes a 'transcendental' sense of 'finding one's deeper, 'transcendental' Self'. (Double underlines represent primary stress and single underlines represent secondary stress.)

(24)　(a)　<u>Sometimes</u> you <u>find</u> yourself in <u>places</u> you never expected.

<div align="right">＜COCA1997#274 : FIC : ArkansasRev＞</div>

　　　(b)　Sometimes you <u>find</u> yourself in <u>places</u> you never <u>expected</u>.

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database for causative verbs occurring with the reflexive, 〔FIND〕 topped the frequency list and I decided to research further.　The metaphorical extension of the verb with the OA construal was then revealed in the data.

13)　Due to the large number of hits, I analyzed a COCA-generated random sample of 1,000 items.

14)　c.f., Lakoff (1980a, 1987) for more information about the 'container' metaphor.

15)　Although in example (23), the reflexive is not technically clause-final, adverbials are notoriously mobile even though they prototypically come before the verb they modify, e.g, in sentence (23) "...I first had to find myself.", "First I had to find myself."

<div align="right">＜COCA1997#274 : FIC : ArkansasRev＞</div>

COCA does not mark stress in its spoken data, and only half of the native speakers solicited offered the 'transcendental' meaning for the above stress pattern in (24b).　Further investigation into this matter would make an interesting future project.

　　［FIND］*self occurs in final position of a relative clause after a preposition. (42.4% of relative clause-final examples.), as in (25a,b) :

(25)　(a)　...no opportunity to react to the context *within which* it finds itself, and it implies....
<div align="right">＜COCA1990#8 : ACAD : CurrentPsych＞</div>
　　　(b)　...had gotten her out of most of the tight spots in which she'd found herself.
<div align="right">＜COCA2004#579 : FIC : Bk : EnemyMyEnemy＞</div>

［LOSE］

　　In this 500-item random sample, 42 items (8.4%) needed to be discounted due to ; i) the literal meaning of ［lose］, ii) the *intensifying* use of ［-self］, iii) a form of the expression 'get lost' expressed as '*Go lose yourself*', iv) examples in which the song by musician Eminem named, "Lose Yourself" appeared (7 occurrences).　This final example was particularly interesting because the chorus included the OA conception under investigation.　The chorus is given in (26) below :

(26)　"You better *lose yourself* in the music, the moment
　　　You own it, you better never let it go
　　　...(You better)"[16]　　　　　Eminem, 2002

　　The majority of complements for OA-［LOSE］ were comprised of prepositional phrases.　The preposition 'in' is most prolific, accounting for 66% of all occurrences.　This may again be explained semantically through the 'Mind is a Container' (Lakoff, 1980a) metaphor.　Other prepositions in order of frequency are : '**to**', '**among**', '**at**', '**for**', 'against', 'with', '**under**', '**during**', 'around', 'from', 'through', '**outside of**' and 'by'.[17]　Examples of these are as follows :

(27)　(a)　All I knew is that I could lose myself in that world.
<div align="right">＜COCA2002#8 : FIC : ContempFic＞</div>
　　　(b)　...and in time she ended up losing herself to the music and the crowd-feeling...
<div align="right">＜COCA1998#110 : FIC : Bk : Plainsong＞</div>
　　　(c)　...presumably to lose himself among the coach-class passengers...
<div align="right">＜COCA2006#135 : FIC : FantasySciFi＞</div>
　　　(d)　...when he started to lose himself at the poker table.
<div align="right">＜COCA2003#222 : SPOK : NPR : FreshAir＞</div>

[16]　Source : http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/eminem/loseyourself.html
[17]　Prepositions in bold also refer to the above metaphorical 'container' schema.

(e)　I lose myself <u>for</u> a few moments...　　　　　＜COCA2005#343：FIC：LiteraryRev＞

(f)　He loves rap music, and during meets loses himself <u>under</u> his headphones...

<COCA2004#482：NEWS：WashPost>

(g)　...except for losing herself during Earth Zero, she had comported herself <u>with</u> all the dignity...　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　<COCA2008#147：FIC：Analog>

(h)　Sometimes I get stuck in the confinement of a real guitar.　I forget to lose myself <u>outside of</u> those boundaries, and my picking hand will stay where it stays...

<COCA2008#192：NEWS：Denver>

［CATCH］

　　From the 500-item random sample, a large number of non-OA items (108 items；21.6%) were discounted due to i) the intensifying［-self］and ii) the literal meaning of［catch］.　Because of their high frequency, I provide a few typical examples (28a,b) below：

(28)　(a)　I might like to catch myself a fish...　　　　　＜COCA2004#139：FIC：Esquiure＞

　　　(b)　...and catching it (the ball) if I (sic) can get my hands on it."　The catch itself felt a lot like practice, but everything else was in slow motion.

<COCA2005#143：MAG：SportingNews> (My parenthesis)

In the remaining 78.4% of the data,［CATCH］represents an OA conception, as in the examples (29a, b) below：

(29)　(a)　She catches herself in a warped mirror...

<COCA2007#98：FIC：Mov：MargotWedding>

　　　(b)　Annie catches herself, covers her mouth in embarrassment.

<COCA1993#65：FIC：Mov：AmericanPresident>

　　Many instances (282 items；56.4%) of［CATCH］involve the monitoring of speech acts (mental or verbal) or vocal actions such as laughing or grunting, specifically, stopping oneself from doing, thinking or saying those things out loud, such as in (30a-d)：

(30)　(a)　Hirsch counsels clients to use techniques such as monitoring self-talk – catching yourself when you start to think negatively...　　　＜COCA2003#1：ACAD：ABAJournal＞

　　　(b)　...shock almost made him raise his voice again, but at the last second he caught himself.

<COCA2009#10：FIC：Analog>

　　　(c)　She caught herself humming the song as she put the pot on the fire.

<COCA1992#22：FIC：Bk：IamClay>

　　　(d)　She laughs, but catches herself.　She knows the man is trying hard.

<COCA2009#70：NEWS：WashPost>

In cases where the complement of the predicate is a physicality or where the prominent discourse schema is a physicality (not including the discourse subject itself), OA-verbs *catch*, *shock*, and *pinch* assume their literal meaning, as in (31a-c) :

(31)　(a)　Berthe stumbled forward and caught herself against the wall of the mausoleum.
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　<COCA2011#49 : FIC : BK : MadameBovarysDaughter>

　　　(b)　...my skin has lost much of its elasticity.　If I pinch myself on the forearm, the little flesh mound stays there for a few seconds...　　　<COCA2008#10 : FIC : Bk : Slumberland>

　　　(c)　Haynes is the master of courtroom theatrics.　He once shocked himself with a cattle prod in open court to show the jury that....　　　<COCA2009#6 : ACAD : ABAJournal>

When, however, the predicate has no modifier or the when modifier is a non-physical entity, the verb assumes the OA construal (32a-d) :

(32)　(a)　"...at practices during minicamp and organized team activities, Asiata *discovered himself* in a most unexpected position."　　　　　　　　　　　<COCA2010#7 : NEWS>

　　　(b)　"...he will get relaxed, perhaps playing a little PlayStation Vita.　Then he will *lose himself* in rap songs by Waka Flocka Flame or Machine Gun Kelly..."　<COCA 2012#21 : NEWS)

　　　(c)　"He brought minimal provisions and devoted himself to meditation, *forgetting himself*, food, and even the world around him."　　　　　　　<COCA 2004#42 : NEWS>

　　　(d)　"Soon after graduating from high school, she joined a running class and quickly *surprised herself* by running five miles."　　　　　　　　　　<COCA2009#50 : NEWS>

Discussion

This research has attempted to define, describe, and exemplify a subtle aspect of cognitive construal and linguistic conception in which Self-Awareness is foregrounded in perception and profiled in predication.　Because this area of research is still in its infancy, the discussion here was meant to be a preliminary sounding board of sorts.　It was my attempt to describe the effects of human awareness, however intangible, illusive and fleeting, on everyday language formation and use.　I also realize that there is much more depth and breath I could have included in related fields such as cognitive psychology, cognitive neuropsychology, philosophy, bio- and neuro-linguistics, etc... as well as in the data itself (Grossman, forthcoming).　I take full responsibility for any pieces of this complex puzzle that might be lacking.

It is my sincere hope that this endeavor spurs more research and conversation relating Self-Awareness and language, and that serious research of the Self is no longer the 'ugly ducking' of the scientific family, but a cherished member that can be as rigorously scrutinized as its 'objectively observed' science siblings.　The age for that reality is upon us now with new, real-time brain scanning equipment and ever-more sophisticated psychological testing devices.　Perhaps, just as Quantum Physics has revealed the energetically multi-dimensional neutrinos (which Gotama Buddha experienced and reported on over 2,500 years ago, calling them 'Kalapas'), maybe one day soon hard(er) science will discover this Self, the

same one that Yogis, Buddhists, and other meditation-based disciplines have reported on in minute detail for over five millennia.　As researchers, we can only continue the work as we know best.　As Socrates so pointedly reflected, "Oh man, know thyself and thou shall know the Universe of the Gods !"

Appendix 1

Categories of OA-verbs (preliminary)

Lost & Found	View	Knowledge & Ignorance	Appearance	Comfort & Punishment	Containment	Judgment	Acceptance & Denial	Causatives
find	see	consider	portray	console	take	ask	steele	make
lose	picture	define	cast	compose	hold	question	accustom	have
catch	watch	think	paint	reassure	gather	judge	resign	force
surprise	view	understand	bill	congratulate	collect	answer	bring	let
discover	imagine	regard	depict	comfort	contain	police	challenge	enable
shock	envision	fancy	draw	calm	open	justify	empower	get
pinch	recognize	redefine	describe	assure	expose	warn	motivate	
impress	perceive	experience		love	form	implicate	deny	
remember	visualize	fashion		cheer	arrange	investigate	expect	
reinvent	examine	believe		pat	empty		psych	
remind	notice	kid		please	split		content	
forget		fool		ease	extend		trouble	
distract		delude		thank	leave		promise	
leave		doubt		like	control		accept	
		betray		soothe				
		trick		berate				
		deceive		kick				
		concern		chastise				
				hate				
				blame				
				punish				
				reproach				
				curse				
				scold				
				nurture				

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